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CONSTITUTIONAL ANOMALIES OR ASAPPLIED CHALLENGES? A DEFENSE OF
RELIGIOUS EXEMPTIONS
STEPHANIE H. BARCLAY *
MARK L. RIENZI**
Abstract: In the wake of Burwell v. Hobby Lobby and now in anticipation of
Craig v. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc., the notion that religious exemptions are
dangerously out of step with norms of Constitutional jurisprudence has taken
on a renewed popularity. Critics increasingly claim that religious exemptions,
such as those available prior to Employment Division v. Smith and now available under the federal Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), are a threat
to basic fairness, equality, and the rule of law. Under this view, exemptions
create an anomalous private right to ignore laws that everyone else must obey,
and such a scheme will result in a tidal wave of religious claimants striking
down government action. Our Article presents an observation that undermines
these central criticisms. Far from being “anomalous” or “out of step” with our
constitutional traditions, religious exemptions are just a form of “as-applied”
challenges offered as a default remedy elsewhere in constitutional adjudication. Courts regularly provide exemptions from generally applicable laws for
other First Amendment protected activity like expressive conduct that mirror
the exemptions critics fear in the context of religious exercise. The Article also presents original empirical analysis, including a national survey of all federal RFRA cases since Hobby Lobby, indicating that concerns of critics about
religious exemptions have not been borne out as an empirical matter. Our
findings suggest that even after Hobby Lobby, cases dealing with religious exemption requests remain much less common than cases dealing with other expressive claims, and are less likely to result in invalidation of government actions. Thus, far from creating anomalous preferential treatment that threatens
the rule of law, a religious exemption framework simply offers a similar level
of protection courts have long provided for dissenting minority rights housed
elsewhere in the First Amendment.
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INTRODUCTION
Religious exemptions create an “anomaly” within our legal system—
an unfair special privilege to ignore the laws everyone else must obey. 1
Worse still, protecting the rights of diverse religious claimants in our nation
will “be courting anarchy” by turning our law into “swiss cheese” and inviting a tidal wave of litigation. 2
So goes one of the most common refrains raised by critics of religious
exemptions. Some prominent free exercise cases have traded on these assumptions, most notably the famous and controversial case of Employment
Division v. Smith. 3 Many of the recent criticisms of religious exemptions
rely on these assumptions, both in the context of exemptions offered constitutionally or statutorily through laws such as the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (“RFRA”). 4 And these arguments are being made with increasing
frequency and volume in the wake of Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 5
and now in anticipation of Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil
Rights Commission. 6 But are these arguments really accurate?
A closer look at religious exemptions cases—particularly in comparison with other types of First Amendment cases—shows that the claim of
unfair favoritism is not correct. This Article presents the claim that religious
exemption requests are just a version of what is generally thought of as one
of the most common, modest, and preferred modes of constitutional adjudication: the as-applied challenge. This is true regardless of whether the reli1
Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 886 (1990); see also Mary Anne
Case, Why “Live-and-Let-Live” Is Not a Viable Solution to the Difficult Problems of Religious
Accommodation in the Age of Sexual Civil Rights, 88 S. CAL. L. REV. 463, 469, 471 (2015) (arguing that Employment Division v. Smith was correctly decided, and that the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act (“RFRA”) both causes problems of administrability for religious exemptions and
results in problematic preferential treatment of some types of religious claims).
2
Smith, 494 U.S. at 888; JOHN CORVINO ET AL., DEBATING RELIGIOUS LIBERTY AND DISCRIMINATION 52 (2017); see also infra notes 71–92 (surveying arguments of critics); infra notes
267–303 and accompanying text (reviewing empirical analysis of religious exemption cases).
3
Smith, 494 U.S. at 886; see also Brian A. Freeman, Expiating the Sins of Yoder and Smith:
Toward a Unified Theory of First Amendment Exemptions from Neutral Laws of General Applicability, 66 MO. L. REV. 9, 11 (2001) (“explor[ing] the extent to which the Constitution requires
exemptions from neutral laws of general applicability in order to protect the free exercise of religion”); Kenneth Marin, Employment Division v. Smith: The Supreme Court Alters the State of
Free Exercise Doctrine, 40 AM. U. L. REV. 1431, 1433–75 (1991) (surveying the historical development of free exercise jurisprudence). See generally Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 167
(1878) (concluding that allowing religious exemptions would result in a “[g]overnment . . . only in
name”).
4
42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (2012).
5
134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
6
Craig v. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc., 370 P.3d 272, 280–81 (Colo. App. 2015), cert. denied
sub nom. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, No. 2015SC738, 2016 WL
1645027 (Colo. Apr. 25, 2016), cert. granted sub nom. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil
Rights Comm’n, 137 S. Ct. 2290 (2017) (mem.).
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gious exemptions are offered constitutionally or through statutes such as
RFRA. Furthermore, under this form of as-applied adjudication, courts regularly provide identical exemptions in the context of expressive conduct
that critics fear in the context of religious exercise protections.
For example, in religious exemption cases, as in other expressive conduct as-applied challenges, the decision-maker is asked to find that a constitutional right would be infringed by a particular application of an otherwise
valid law not specifically aimed at protected activity. The remedy in both
contexts is a court order protecting the exercise of the constitutional right,
but otherwise leaving the law in place to apply to other circumstances that
may arise. In fact, the aspect of religious exemptions that generates most of
the criticism—the limited carve-out from a law that otherwise remains in
place to apply to others—has been widely praised elsewhere as making asapplied challenges preferable to more aggressive constitutional remedies,
such as facial invalidation. 7
Furthermore, there are deep structural similarities between the asapplied challenges in the expressive realm and the religious exercise realm.
Thus, far from being problematic anomalies “in tension with other constitutional principles,” the Supreme Court has described limited carve-outs as
“the basic building blocks of constitutional adjudication.” 8 When religious
exemption requests are properly understood as as-applied challenges, they
actually look quite pedestrian, particularly in comparison to how constitutional challenges work to protect other First Amendment interests. 9
But what about the concern that providing religious exemptions will
result in our society “courting anarchy?” Is there something uniquely pervasive and dangerous about religious exemption requests? Is it true that the
diverse religious views in our country mean we will face an “endless chain
of exemption demands” that are much more expansive than other types of
First Amendment activity? 10 And particularly in the wake of Hobby Lobby,
will we face a tidal wave of litigation by an endless line of religious objectors who then become a law unto themselves and strike down government
action at every turn?
7

Of course, not all religious liberty claims are exemption requests. Some religious liberty
claims seek to strike down laws on their face, including under the Establishment Clause or if the
law engages in facial targeting under the Free Exercise Clause. Church of the Lukumi Babalu
Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 526, 531–32 (1993) (holding invalid a law restricting the Santeria religious ritual of animal sacrifice); Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 580–81 (1987)
(holding facially invalid a law requiring teaching “creation sciences” because it lacked a “clear
secular purpose”).
8
Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 167–68 (2007); William P. Marshall, Bad Statutes Make
Bad Law: Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, 2014 SUP. CT. REV. 71, 74.
9
See infra notes 267–303 and accompanying text.
10
See infra notes 152–178 and accompanying text.
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Our original empirical analysis suggests otherwise. 11 The data suggests
that expressive claims are much more pervasive than religious claims, both
in absolute terms and as a percentage of all reported cases. We also provide
a new survey of all federal RFRA decisions since Hobby Lobby, which analyzes how the Supreme Court’s decision in Hobby Lobby impacted win
rates of reported religious exercise cases. The data does not demonstrate a
dramatic increase in the win rate of religious exercise litigants under RFRA.
This may be explained, in part, because there are important legal limitations
on successful religious claims, like the requirement of sincerity.
So what explains the treatment we give to religious exemptions compared to other First Amendment exemptions? One clue likely comes from the
divergent 1940s cases of Minersville School District v. Gobitis and West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette. 12 It may be that the Supreme
Court’s embrace of a majoritarian approach to religious exercise in Gobitis
(as later affirmed by Smith) leads critics of religious exemptions to view religious exercise rights more skeptically, even though neither the jurisprudential
comparison to similar rights nor the empirical data justify such differential
criticism and alarm. In fact, the Court firmly rejected the Gobitis approach
under Barnette, and instead opted for a strong counter-majoritarian framework for expressive rights. 13 Viewed in this context, a religious exemption
scheme such as RFRA is simply a restoration of a pluralistic protection of
dissenting rights through as-applied challenges.
Part I of this Article surveys scholarly criticisms of religious exemptions as a threat to equality and the rule of law. 14 Part II sets forth an alternate view of religious exemptions as narrow, as-applied challenges that are
elsewhere viewed as the preferred mode of constitutional adjudication. This
Part explores how in the particularly relevant comparator context of compelled speech, courts regularly provide exemptions from generally applicable laws that mirror the exemptions critics fear in the context of religious
exercise. 15 Part III discusses the authors’ original empirical analysis of religious versus speech claims to illustrate that, contrary to scholarly apprehension, Hobby Lobby has not had a dramatic effect on government win rates in
religious exemption challenges, nor have religious claims undergone a dramatic expansion in volume following Hobby Lobby. If anything, the volume
11

See infra notes 267–289 and accompanying text.
W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 640–42 (1943) (holding that compelling students to salute the flag and say the pledge of allegiance, despite their religious objections,
violated their First Amendment rights); Minersville Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S.
586, 598–600 (1940) (holding constitutional a compulsory flag salute in school), overruled by
Barnette, 319 U.S. 624.
13
Barnette, 319 U.S. at 641.
14
See infra notes 17–67 and accompanying text.
15
See infra notes 68–232 and accompanying text.
12
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of these cases appears to be slightly decreasing as a percentage of all reported cases. 16
I. THE CRITICISM OF RELIGIOUS EXEMPTIONS AS
ANOMALOUS AND DANGEROUS
A. Smith and Initial Backlash
Critics of religious exemptions frequently rely on Justice Antonin Scalia’s majority opinion in Smith. 17 There, the Supreme Court rejected the notion that the Free Exercise Clause requires religious exemptions from generally applicable and neutral laws. 18 To overrule prior precedent that favored such exemptions, Justice Scalia relied on two justifications that remain influential among modern critics of religious exemptions: (1) religious
exemptions allow objectors to unfairly avoid compliance with an otherwise
valid law, and (2) allowing exemptions in our radically diverse society
would court anarchy. 19
First, Justice Scalia argued that religious exemptions were tantamount
to “a private right to ignore generally applicable laws,” which would result
in “a constitutional anomaly.” 20 A person’s religious views, Justice Scalia
explained, do not “excuse him from compliance with an otherwise valid law
prohibiting conduct that the State is free to regulate.” 21 Viewing exemptions
through this lens, Justice Scalia framed the issue in the case as “decid[ing]
whether the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment permits the State
of Oregon to include religiously inspired peyote use within the reach of its
general criminal prohibition on use of that drug . . . .” 22 This issue arose in
the context of a state’s decision to deny unemployment benefits to a Native
American person fired for violating a state prohibition on the use of peyote,
even though the use of the drug was part of a religious ritual. Justice Scalia
argued that the “government’s ability to enforce generally applicable prohibitions of socially harmful conduct, like its ability to carry out other aspects
of public policy, ‘cannot depend on measuring the effects of a governmental
action on a religious objector’s spiritual development.’” 23
16

See infra notes 233–341 and accompanying text.
Smith, 494 U.S. at 874, 878–89.
18
Id. at 882. The Supreme Court has since whittled away at this principle from Smith. See,
e.g., Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171, 188–90 (2012)
(recognizing an exemption from the generally applicable Americans with Disabilities Act).
19
Smith, 494 U.S. at 879, 888.
20
Id. at 886.
21
Id. at 878–79.
22
Id. at 874.
23
Id. at 885 (quoting Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439, 451
(1988)).
17
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Justice Scalia even went so far as to argue that valid, generally applicable laws that did not target religion could not really burden religious exercise. He noted that the Free Exercise Clause would certainly prohibit a
law that specifically targeted a religious group or practice, by doing things
like banning statues used for worship purposes. 24 But it would be quite another thing, he argued, for the Free Exercise Clause to create an exemption
from a law that was not “specifically directed at their religious practice” and
when the law is otherwise constitutional when applied to others who engage
in the practice for non-religious reasons. 25 A generally applicable and neutral law, according to Justice Scalia, could no more burden religious exercise than it could “abridg[e] the freedom . . . of the press” if the law does
not target such constitutional activity; instead, the burden on them is an “incidental effect of a generally applicable and otherwise valid provision.” 26
Justice Scalia thus explained that heightened scrutiny was “inapplicable” to
a challenge to “an across-the-board . . . prohibition on a particular form of
conduct.” 27
In a portion of the opinion addressing the tension this approach created
with existing law, Justice Scalia acknowledged several court decisions in
other constitutional contexts. This included speech, press, and association
cases where the “First Amendment bars application of a neutral, generally
applicable law to religiously motivated action,” or else “compelled expression” that implicates religious freedom. 28 In an attempt to distinguish these
cases, Justice Scalia developed his hybrid rights theory and observed that
these cases involved free exercise claims alongside other constitutional
rights, or else were based solely upon freedom of speech. 29 Justice Scalia
also argued that employing heightened scrutiny “before the government
may regulate the content of speech . . . is not remotely comparable to using
it for” religious exemptions. 30 He argued that heightened scrutiny in the
speech context, which allows the “unrestricted flow of contending speech,”
is merely a constitutional norm, whereas a religious exemption would result
in a constitutionally anomalous “private right to ignore generally applicable
laws. . . .” 31
Second, Justice Scalia argued that religious exemptions are particularly
problematic in “a cosmopolitan nation made up of people of almost every
24

Id. at 877–78.
Id. at 878.
26
Id.
27
Id. at 884–85.
28
Id. at 881–82.
29
Id.
30
Id. at 886.
31
Id.
25
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conceivable religious preference,” and this “danger increases in direct proportion to the society’s diversity of religious beliefs.” 32 “[W]e cannot afford
the luxury of deeming presumptively invalid, as applied to the religious objector, every regulation of conduct that does not protect an interest of the
highest order,” he explained. 33 Applying heightened scrutiny for such “religious divergence” would “open the prospect of constitutionally required
religious exemptions from civic obligations of almost every conceivable
kind.” 34 Some of the contexts Justice Scalia used as examples where problematic exemptions could be requested included drug laws, traffic laws, or
animal cruelty laws. 35 Thus, in the view of Justice Scalia, “adopting such a
system would be courting anarchy.” 36
Justice Scalia acknowledged that other First Amendment rights, like
free speech and press, sometimes bar “application of a neutral, generally
applicable law to religiously motivated action.” 37 But although he explained
descriptively this difference between religious and other First Amendment
rights under his regime, he never justified normatively why this distinction
between religious exercise and other First Amendment rights should exist.
When the Supreme Court’s decision in Smith was handed down, it received widespread criticism. One scholar noted that in academia generally,
“criticism of Smith . . . has become commonplace.” 38 The criticism was not
32

Id. at 888 (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).
Id.
34
Id.
35
Id. at 889.
36
Id. at 888.
37
Id. at 881.
38
See Ira C. Lupu, Employment Division v. Smith and the Decline of Supreme CourtCentrism, 1993 BYU L. REV. 259, 260 n.9 (collecting sources that discuss potential implications
of Smith); see also Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 559 (1993)
(Souter, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment) (noting that there are doubts as to
whether “the Smith rule merits adherence”); Richard F. Duncan, Free Exercise Is Dead, Long Live
Free Exercise: Smith, Lukumi and the General Applicability Requirement, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L.
850, 851–56 (2001) (arguing that despite the conclusion and subsequent criticism of Smith free
exercise is still “alive and well”); James D. Gordon III, Free Exercise on the Mountaintop, 79
CALIF. L. REV. 91, 114 (1991) (“What is there to admire [about Smith]? The Court wanted to
reach its result in the worst way, and it succeeded.”); Douglas Laycock, The Remnants of Free
Exercise, 1990 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 2–3 (arguing that Smith was incorrectly decided based on precedent and original intent); Marin, supra note 3, at 1475–76 (1991) (arguing that “the Smith Court
has rendered the free exercise clause impotent”); Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith Decision, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1109, 1111 (1990) (“There are many ways in
which to criticize the Smith decision. . . . Smith is contrary to the deep logic of the First Amendment.”); Harry F. Tepker, Jr., Hallucinations of Neutrality in the Oregon Peyote Case, 16 AM.
INDIAN L. REV. 1, 11–26 (1991) (critiquing Justice Antonin Scalia’s use of history and precedent
in the Smith decision); Carol M. Kaplan, Note, The Devil Is in the Details: Neutral, Generally
Applicable Laws and Exceptions from Smith, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1045, 1046 (2000) (arguing that
“[Smith] was not well crafted and was based on a mischaracterization of precedent”); Mark J.
Rosen, Comment, Native Americans May Be Denied State Unemployment Benefits for Ceremonial
33
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limited to academia—religious, political, and civil rights leaders also joined
in from across the political spectrum, with Ted Kennedy, Bill Clinton, and
the ACLU joining forces with Orrin Hatch and the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops in efforts to repair what they saw as damage done
by Smith. 39
This backlash resulted in the nearly unanimous passage of RFRA to reinstate a religious exemption framework. 40 When RFRA was passed in 1993,
the bill was supported by one of the broadest bipartisan coalitions in recent
political history, with sixty-six religious and civil liberties groups, including
Muslims, Sikhs, Humanists, and secular civil liberties organizations such as
the ACLU and Americans United for Separation of Church and State. 41
B. Smith’s Academic Resurgence
In light of recent hot-button religious exemption cases like Hobby
Lobby, 42 and now Masterpiece Cakeshop, 43 legal academic support for
Ingestion of Peyote Without Violating First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause, 23 RUTGERS L.J.
209, 230 (1991) (arguing that “[t]he Court’s cursory disregard for precedent in arriving at its holding suggests the Court’s willingness to forego long-standing doctrinal jurisprudence, and substitute its new, stultified vision of the Free Exercise liberties ‘protected’ by the Constitution”); Whitney Travis, Note, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act and Smith: Dueling Levels of Constitutional Scrutiny, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1701, 1707 (2007) (noting that “Smith was met with
enormous criticism”). To be sure, Smith did have some contemporaneous academic defenders.
See, e.g., Philip A. Hamburger, A Constitutional Right of Religious Exemption: An Historical
Perspective, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 915, 916 (1992) (questioning the originalist historical evidence in favor of religious exemptions); William P. Marshall, In Defense of Smith and Free Exercise Revisionism, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 308, 309 (1991) (defending “Smith’s rejection of constitutionally compelled free exercise exemptions without defending Smith itself”).
39
See Brett H. McDonnell, The Liberal Case for Hobby Lobby, 57 ARIZ. L. REV. 777, 784
(2015) (“Given the politics currently surrounding RFRA, it should come as little surprise that
many religious organizations objected to the decision in Smith. It is more surprising that many
liberal civil rights organizations objected as well—the ACLU, Americans United for the Separation of Church and State, People for the American Way, and Americans for Democratic Action
came together in a powerful coalition that proposed a statutory overturning of Smith. . . . Thus, at
the Court, in Congress, and in the White House, a large number of liberals supported the principle
of religious liberty embodied in RFRA.”).
40
42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (2012); Douglas Laycock & Oliver S. Thomas, Interpreting the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 73 TEX. L. REV. 209, 210, 243–44 (1994); Ira C. Lupu, The Failure of RFRA, 20 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 575, 588 (1998) (noting that “RFRA is federal law,
supported by a near unanimous House and Senate and an enthusiastic President”); Travis, supra
note 38, at 1707 (noting that “[i]n direct response to Smith, Congress passed the RFRA in 1993
with nearly unanimous support in both the House and the Senate”).
41
Laycock & Thomas, supra note 40, at 210 n.9; Travis Gasper, Comment, A Religious Right
to Discriminate: Hobby Lobby and “Religious Freedom” as a Threat to the LGBT Community, 3
TEX. A&M L. REV. 395, 416 (2015) (noting that “the groups most active in pushing for passage of
the 1993 RFRA were ideologically left of center”).
42
134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
43
Craig v. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc., 370 P.3d 272, 280–81 (Colo. App. 2015), cert. denied
sub nom. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, No. 2015SC738, 2016 WL
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RFRA has declined, while the once-maligned reasoning of Smith has recently resurfaced. As many commentators have observed, “the space for accommodating religious objections to general legal obligations is increasingly contested in contemporary American legal, political, and ethical discourse.” 44 In particular, the question of whether “demands for exemptions
from generally applicable laws” are justified is “an issue that has recently
assumed increased significance . . . .” 45
For example, in the wake of recent RFRA cases, one scholar recently
advanced “the normative view that Smith was correctly decided and that . . .
[RFRA] was a mistake.” 46 Another argued that “Smith was decided the way
it was for a reason.” 47 Another defended the principal holding of Smith that
when you have “a neutral state law that applies to everyone,” this law
should apply to all without religious exceptions. 48 And still another argued
that Justice Scalia correctly decided Smith in holding that “[r]eligion is not a
get-out-of-the-law-free-card.” 49 Notably, most of these critics do not object
in principle to protecting religious liberty; rather, the objections of critics
generally boil down to the same two primary arguments Justice Scalia relied
on in Smith.
First, critics argue that religious exemptions from otherwise valid laws
provide an anomalous remedy—essentially an excuse to avoid obeying the
1645027 (Colo. Apr. 25, 2016), cert. granted sub nom. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil
Rights Comm’n, 137 S. Ct. 2290 (2017) (mem.).
44
Hillel Y. Levin et al., To Accommodate or Not to Accommodate: (When) Should the State
Regulate Religion to Protect the Rights of Children and Third Parties?, 73 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
915, 918 (2016); see also Frederick Mark Gedicks, One Cheer for Hobby Lobby: Improbable
Alternatives, Truly Strict Scrutiny, and Third-Party Employee Burdens, 38 HARV. J.L. & GENDER
153, 176 (2015) (expressing concern about Burwell v. Hobby Lobby’s “unprecedented expansion
of permissive accommodation” as an “‘opt-out’ from generally applicable legislation”); Paul
Horwitz, The Hobby Lobby Moment, 128 HARV. L. REV. 154, 170 (2014) (arguing that “[a] substantial body of opinion on this issue has moved from the view that Smith erred grievously by
rejecting the prior regime of free exercise exemptions from generally applicable law, . . . to a
broader questioning of religious accommodations altogether”); Maimon Schwarzschild, Do Religious Exemptions Save?, 53 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 185, 187 (2016) (“[S]upport for religious exemptions may now be breaking down along ideological-political lines. . . . [O]utright opposition to the
idea of religious exemption was uncommonly met with until very recently, either in politics or in
the legal literature.”); Elizabeth Sepper, Reports of Accommodation’s Death Have Been Greatly
Exaggerated, 128 HARV. L. REV. F. 24, 24 (2014), http://harvardlawreview.org/wpcontent/uploads/2014/11/vol_128_Sepper.pdf [https://perma.cc/4W9U-DKWT] (claiming a growing consensus “against granting religious exemptions from generally applicable laws”).
45
Laura M. Weinrib, Freedom of Conscience in War Time: World War I and the Limits of
Civil Liberties, 65 EMORY L.J. 1051, 1054 (2016).
46
Case, supra note 1, at 469.
47
Marshall, supra note 8, at 74.
48
Haley Gray, What You Need to Know About the Masterpiece Cakeshop Case, 5280: DENVER
MAG. (June 28, 2017), http://www.5280.com/2017/06/what-you-need-to-know-about-masterpiececakeshop-v-colorado-civil-rights-commission/ [https://perma.cc/FYJ6-T94Z].
49
CORVINO ET AL., supra note 2, at 31.
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laws that apply to everyone else. They have been described as “a troubling
form of relief—special exemptions from neutral laws for a limited class of
beneficiaries—that is in tension with other constitutional principles,” or as
not “in the tradition of American liberty.” 50 Under this view, exemptions are
problematic because they allow religious objectors to avoid “play[ing] by
the same rules as everyone else.” 51 Thus, if a given law is justified at all,
then the law ought to be applied consistently. 52 Offering exemptions, one
scholar argues, would “result in a kind of ‘Swiss cheese’ law.” 53 Professor
Frederick Gedicks asserts that RFRA defies common sense and the constitution by giving religious believers “a free pass to ignore laws that bind everyone else.” 54 Professors Ira Lupu and Robert Tuttle similarly argue that
extending “strict, rights-protective review to laws that imposed an incidental burden on religious experience thus elevated religious freedom to a
preferred position among First Amendment rights, rather than assimilating
the Free Exercise Clause with its counterpart rights of speech and press.” 55
The view that religious exemptions are anomalous quickly leads to the
conclusion that recipients of such exemptions are getting preferential treatment under the law, or as one scholar asserted, “disconcerting favoritism”
for religious objectors. 56 Some raise concerns that religious accommodations would result in particularly problematic special treatment in the context of anti-discrimination laws, including the public accommodation laws
at issue in Masterpiece Cakeshop. 57 Other scholars echo these allegations of
special privilege for religion under a religious accommodation scheme. 58
50

Case, supra note 1, at 469–70 (noting that “the sorts of religious exemptions from generally
applicable laws typically proposed by proponents of a live-and-let-live solution to the sexual culture wars are neither workable nor in the tradition of American liberty” (internal quotation marks
omitted)); Marshall, supra note 8, at 74; see also Dan T. Coenen, Free Speech and Generally
Applicable Laws: A New Doctrinal Synthesis, 103 IOWA L. REV. 435, 466 (2018) (“[S]ingling out
religious practitioners for special treatment in applying generally applicable laws creates a tension
with the constitutional norm, rooted largely in the Establishment Clause, of ensuring the state’s
complete neutrality toward religion. Stated another way, exempting members of particular religious traditions from laws that apply to everyone else smacks of advantaging both religion in
general and some religions over others.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
51
CORVINO ET AL., supra note 2, at 22.
52
Id. at 22, 31.
53
Id. at 52.
54
Frederick Mark Gedicks, Is Religion an Excuse for Breaking the Law?, NEWSWEEK (Mar. 12,
2016, 10:51 AM), http://www.newsweek.com/are-religious-beliefs-excuse-breaking-law-435664
[https://perma.cc/R54Y-XEM4].
55
IRA C. LUPU & ROBERT W. TUTTLE, SECULAR GOVERNMENT: RELIGIOUS PEOPLE 11–12
(2014).
56
Marshall, supra note 8, at 74; see also Case, supra note 1, at 486–87 (raising concerns
about the risk of “unconstitutional favoritism implicit in proposals for special religious accommodations”).
57
See generally MARCI A. HAMILTON, GOD VS. THE GAVEL: THE PERILS OF EXTREME RELIGIOUS LIBERTY (2d rev. ed. 2014) (discussing the problems inherent to “extreme” legal protec-
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Second, critics argue that religious accommodations are uniquely pervasive, such that they deteriorate the rule of law and risk anarchy, particularly post Hobby Lobby. In this vein, Professor Case argues that Hobby
Lobby has “open[ed] up the floodgates to a host of new potential claims for
religious exemption by a host of different kinds of service providers.” 59 Professor Leslie Griffin argues that because of Hobby Lobby, the “broad reading of RFRA . . . will encourage many future lawsuits and undermine more
civil liberties.” 60 She also asserted that “[a]lmost anything can be turned
into a claim of ‘cooperation with evil’” and “all federal laws are now subject to challenge, with the possibility of every citizen becoming ‘a law unto
himself’ until the rule of law is undermined.” 61 Professor Elizabeth Sepper
tions for religious freedom, starting with RFRA and its offshoots); Samuel R. Bagenstos, The
Unrelenting Libertarian Challenge to Public Accommodations Law, 66 STAN. L. REV. 1205,
1238–40 (2014); Case, supra note 1, at 485 (noting that “[a]dvocates of exemptions from public
accommodation laws for service providers who refuse to provide flowers or cake for same-sex
wedding celebrations have yet to explain whether and why the claims of these Christian bakers
and florists are more worthy of accommodation” than other groups); Lucien J. Dhooge, Public
Accommodation Statutes, Sexual Orientation and Religious Liberty: Free Access or Free Exercise?, 27 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 58 (2016) (arguing that “any conflicts between religious
liberty asserted by secular businesses and access to goods and services must be resolved in favor
of the government’s compelling interest in guaranteeing full and non-discriminatory access for all
persons,” and that this “result does not denigrate religion”) (internal footnote omitted); Martin S.
Lederman, Reconstructing RFRA: The Contested Legacy of Religious Freedom Restoration, 125
YALE L.J. F. 416, 419 (2016), https://www.yalelawjournal.org/pdf/Lederman_PDF_pt9q3ynr.pdf
[https://perma.cc/R72J-26CV] (arguing that “there is widespread fear in some quarters—and presumably hope in others—that such claims might become a template for similar claims, pursuant to
federal or state RFRAs or analogous state constitutional provisions, for religious exemptions from
laws that prohibit discrimination in employment, or in the provision of public accommodations, on
the basis of sexual orientation”); Douglas NeJaime & Reva B. Siegel, Conscience Wars: ComplicityBased Conscience Claims in Religion and Politics, 124 YALE L.J. 2516, 2561–64 (2015) (noting
concern that religious exemptions could be granted from public accommodations laws through
“complicity-based conscience claims”); Leslie C. Griffin, If Conestoga Wins, Watch Out Civil Rights,
HAMILTON & GRIFFIN ON RIGHTS (Mar. 24, 2014), http://hamilton-griffin.com/if-conestoga-winswatch-out-civil-rights/ [https://perma.cc/JBR8-GFVA]. But see Sepper, supra note 44, at 26 (noting
that “[p]ublic accommodations laws generally apply with full force to all businesses serving the
public, religiously affiliated or not”).
58
See Michele Goodwin & Allison M. Whelan, Constitutional Exceptionalism, 2016 U. ILL.
L. REV. 1287, 1329 (arguing that religious accommodations result in a religious “exceptionalism”
where “‘religiously based rights’ trump all other constitutionally derived interests” and result in
“problematic norms”); Schwarzschild, supra note 44, at 199 (noting that “exemptions and accommodations puts religious people in the invidious position of demanding special privileges”
that is particularly troubling “in an egalitarian society, where a core idea is rejection of special
privilege”).
59
Case, supra note 1, at 469, 487.
60
Leslie C. Griffin, Hobby Lobby: The Crafty Case That Threatens Women’s Rights and
Religious Freedom, 42 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 641, 673 (2015).
61
Id. at 687–88; see also Erwin Chemerinsky & Michele Goodwin, Religion Is Not a Basis
for Harming Others: Review Essay of Paul A. Offit’s Bad Faith: When Religious Belief Undermines Modern Medicine, 104 GEO. L.J. 1111, 1133–34 (2016) (“This decision will lead to much
broader challenges. Christian Scientists, for example, will claim that they do not have to provide
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argues that “[t]he Hobby Lobby decision throws open the courtroom door to
corporations and hands them the now-powerful weapon of corporate conscience to fight off regulation that protects the full and equal citizenship of
the people.” 62 Professor Corvino raises concerns that the religious activities
that receive protection for “exemption and accommodation purposes are
expansive and expanding” as a result of Hobby Lobby. 63 Corvino explains
that the “pervasiveness” and “endless variety of religious scruples,” provide
a strong motive not to have an extensive “exemption regime.” 64 Thus, Corvino concludes that it is “precisely for that reason that Justice Scalia opined
[in Smith] that, in a religiously diverse nation, any system requiring strict
scrutiny for laws burdening religious beliefs is ‘courting anarchy.’” 65 Professor Lupu has argued that “a general regime of judicial exemptions is a
lawless, sometimes unconstitutional, and pervasively unprincipled charade.” 66 Numerous others have expressed similar administration concerns. 67

any health insurance to their employees.”); Alan E. Garfield, And the Wall Comes Tumbling
Down: How the Supreme Court Is Striking the Wrong Balance Between Majority and Minority
Rights in Church-and-State Cases, 68 ARK. L. REV. 789, 825 (2015) (arguing that “[b]y tipping
the scales so drastically in favor of religious objectors, Justice Alito put out a welcome mat for
religious objections by corporations”); Christopher T. Robertson, Vaccines and Airline Travel: A
Federal Role to Protect the Public Health, 42 AM. J.L. & MED. 543, 569 (2016) (arguing that “the
ruling casts a shadow over all public health regulation, given that virtually any objector can cloak
their objection in religious garb”); Sarah M. Stephens, An Employer’s Conscience After Hobby
Lobby and the Continuing Conflict Between Women’s Rights and Religious Freedom, 24 BUFF. J.
GENDER, L. & SOC. POL’Y 1, 4 (2016) (“The Court’s significant expansion of religious liberty
doctrine in Hobby Lobby invites businesses to seek exemptions from nondiscrimination laws such
as Title VII, the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, and the Americans with Disabilities Act, as well
as other laws, which provide workplace protections to women, such as the Family and Medical
Leave Act[] . . . .”).
62
Elizabeth Sepper, Gendering Corporate Conscience, 38 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 193, 233
(2015).
63
CORVINO ET AL., supra note 2, at 38.
64
Id. at 46, 47–50 (quoting BRIAN LEITER, WHY TOLERATE RELIGION? 34 (2013)).
65
Id. at 37, 50; see also id. at 36–38; LEITER, supra note 64, at 34.
66
Ira C. Lupu, Hobby Lobby and the Dubious Enterprise of Religious Exemptions, 38 HARV.
J.L. & GENDER 35, 101 (2015).
67
Case, supra note 1, at 468, 469 (positing that Smith is sound jurisprudence “even if for no
other reason, then because of the descriptive impracticability of an approach to religious exemptions from generally applicable law”); Dhooge, supra note 57, at 54 (asserting that RFRA “opens
the prospect of constitutionally required religious exemptions from civic obligations of almost
every conceivable kind,” and “[t]he impact of such an approach . . . contradicts constitutional
tradition and common sense” (internal quotation marks and footnotes omitted)); Marshall, supra
note 8, at 130 (suggesting that providing religious accommodations under RFRA “will exacerbate
the concerns inherent in a jurisprudence that the Court soundly rejected in Smith as both unworkable and normatively unsound”).
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II. RELIGIOUS EXEMPTIONS UNDERSTOOD AS AS-APPLIED CHALLENGES
The question of whether to provide as-applied exemptions from generally applicable laws can be seen as a broader political question about how
our pluralistic society should treat dissenting views or practices. Should
society generally demand conformity to general policies preferred by the
majority, or should it take a “live and let live” approach by allowing minority and nonconformist groups and individuals to live their lives and order
their communities as they see fit where possible? 68 That longstanding debate continues to rage in academia, and will for decades to come. 69 But this
Part illustrates that under Employment Division v. Smith’s framework, courts
are likely to answer the question in favor of accommodating divergent minority positions when it comes to speech-based rights, but not religion. 70

68

Levin et al., supra note 44, at 925.
Some scholars note, “for those Progressives who had confronted the costs of countermajoritarian constitutionalism head on, there was ample reason to interrogate an extension of individual
rights.” Weinrib, supra note 45, at 1136; see also Charles M. Freeland, The Political Process as
Final Solution, 68 IND. L.J. 525, 526 n.11 (1993) (collecting sources and describing the school of
thought viewing reliance on political process instead of robust bill of rights protections as the long
awaited solution to the “countermajoritarian problem” that has plagued the “democracy as material equality”). Still other scholars recognize that robust individual freedoms are critical, even for a
healthy democracy, and cannot merely be what is “left over” after the political process is complete. KENNETH L. KARST, BELONGING TO AMERICA: EQUAL CITIZENSHIP AND THE CONSTITUTION 196–201 (1989) (arguing that denying constitutional rights excludes certain groups from
fully belonging to the American people); Charles A. Reich, The Individual Sector, 100 YALE L.J.
1409, 1412 (1991); see also Owen Fiss, A Life Lived Twice, 100 YALE L.J. 1117, 1118 (1991)
(praising judicial protection of individual liberty against majoritarian will); Michael J. Klarman,
Rethinking the Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Revolutions, 82 VA. L. REV. 1, 19 (1996) (pointing
out that many scholars think Brown proves that courts are “countermajoritarian heroics” who
protect minority rights); David Luban, The Warren Court and the Concept of a Right, 34 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 7, 8 (1999) (same); Michael J. Perry, Protecting Human Rights in a Democracy: What Role for the Courts?, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 635, 637 (2003) (questioning whether
the role of the judiciary in protecting entrenched human rights is appropriate); Jeremy Waldron, A
Rights-Based Critique of Constitutional Rights, 13 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 18, 19–20 (1993)
(questioning our deference to some rights in comparison to others); Rebecca E. Zietlow, The Judicial Restraint of the Warren Court (and Why It Matters), 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 255, 259 n.13 (2008)
(observing over 500 law review articles “written in the past twenty years advocating the proposition that courts should protect minorities against the will of the majority”).
70
See also Corinna Barrett Lain, Three Supreme Court “Failures” and a Story of Supreme
Court Success, 69 VAND. L. REV. 1019, 1072 (2016) (“The Court’s self-conception of its role as a
countermajoritarian protector has helped it stretch to its countermajoritarian limits, at least in certain contexts. Here, several of the Supreme Court’s First Amendment cases come to mind; its
protection of flag burning, cross burning, and Ku Klux Klan rallies as freedom of expression are
prime examples. . . . [M]uch work still needs to be done on why the Justices embrace their countermajoritarian role in some contexts and not others.”).
69
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A. As-Applied Challenges Such as Religious Exemptions Are the
Preferred Mode of Constitutional Adjudication
Relying on Smith, Professor Corvino argues that if a given law is justified at all, then the law ought to be applied “consistently.” 71 Offering exemptions, he argues, “result[s] in a kind of ‘Swiss cheese’ law.” 72 Thus, if a
law is facially valid, it ought to apply universally. As a result, Professor
Corvino and others argue that a judgment that invalidates a law only in one
circumstance, but leaves the law otherwise intact, creates an anomaly resulting in “special rights” for objectors “in tension with other constitutional
principles.” 73
But such a judgment can be described in much more positive terms—
as a “modest,” 74 “normal,” 75 “surgical,” 76 “narrow,” 77 and “logically primary” 78 method that comprise “the basic building blocks of constitutional adjudication.” 79 These latter terms are precisely how both the Supreme Court
and leading commentators describe as-applied adjudication.
The Supreme Court has explained that “the normal rule is that partial,
rather than facial, invalidation is the required course, such that a statute may
be declared invalid to the extent that it reaches too far, but otherwise left
71

CORVINO ET AL., supra note 2, at 31.
Id. at 52.
73
Id.; Marshall, supra note 8, at 74; Schwarzschild, supra note 44, at 199; see also infra notes
152–178 and accompany text.
74
Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. New Eng., 546 U.S. 320, 331 (2006).
75
Id. at 329 (holding that “the ‘normal rule’ is that ‘partial, rather than facial, invalidation is
the required course,’ such that a ‘statute may . . . be declared invalid to the extent that it reaches
too far, but otherwise left intact’”) (quoting Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491, 504
(1985)) (emendations in original).
76
See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Fact and Fiction About Facial Challenges, 99 CALIF. L. REV.
915, 956 (2011) (observing that as-applied challenges involve surgical severing); see also Wash.
State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 451 (2008) (asserting that “facial
challenges threaten to short circuit the democratic process by preventing laws embodying the will
of the people from being implemented in a manner consistent with the Constitution,” and that “a
ruling of unconstitutionality frustrates the intent of the elected representatives of the people” (alterations and quotation marks omitted)).
77
Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 460 (2011).
78
Richard H. Fallon, Jr., As-Applied and Facial Challenges and Third-Party Standing, 113
HARV. L. REV. 1321, 1329, 1368 (2000) (citing United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 5) (1960));
see also Yazoo & Miss. Valley R.R. v. Jackson Vinegar Co., 226 U.S. 217, 219–20 (1912) (holding that a statute that settles claims for “lost or damaged freight” was valid “as applied” to the
facts before the court); Fallon, supra, at 1368 (“[A]s-applied challenges reflect entrenched though
often unarticulated presuppositions that the full meaning of a statute frequently is not obvious on
the occasion of its first application, but can be left to emerge through case-by-case specification;
that familiar processes of interpretation characteristically treat statutes as comprising multiple
subrules; and that any constitutionally invalid subrules through which a statute might be specified
can ordinarily be separated from valid subrules.” (emphasis omitted)).
79
Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 167–68 (2007) (quotation marks omitted).
72
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intact.” 80 Thus, when examining a statute’s constitutionality the Court attempts to narrow its holding to address the specific problem, or “to sever its
problematic portions while leaving the remainder intact.” 81 Such a principle
flows from the “axiom[] that a ‘statute may be invalid as applied to one
state of facts and yet valid as applied to another.” 82 This approach also allows the Court to address more concrete facts and to do the least damage to
the rule of law as envisioned by the original drafters. 83 As Justice Stevens
put it, when the Court strikes down statutes facially, rather than as-applied,
“[t]he Court operates with a sledge hammer rather than a scalpel.” 84
Many scholars also note the Roberts Court’s preference for as-applied
challenges instead of facial ones. 85 This preference has manifested itself in
many different legal contexts, including “abortion rights, Congress’s enforcement power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, and campaign finance.” 86 Professor Richard Fallon has explained that this jurisprudential preference for limited invalidations that leave a statute otherwise
intact generally relies on a three-part rationale: (1) the constitutional principle of “avoiding unnecessary or premature decisions of constitutional issues” where possible; (2) the fact that meanings of statutes are often best
specified “through a series of fact-specific, case-by-case decisions”; and (3)
the reality that constitutionally invalid applications of statutes often “could
be severed or separated from valid ones.” 87 Scholars disagree about the frequency with which the Supreme Court actually employs as-applied versus
facial analysis to strike down statutes, but there is little debate that as80

Ayotte, 546 U.S. at 329 (internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added).
Id. at 328–29 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
82
Id. at 329.
83
Sabri v. United States, 541 U.S. 600, 608–09 (2004) (holding that “facial challenges are
best when infrequent” because “[f]acial adjudication carries too much promise of ‘premature interpretation of statutes’ on the basis of factually barebones records”) (quoting Raines, 362 U.S. at
22) (emendations omitted); see also Wash. State Grange, 552 U.S. at 450–51 (holding that “facial
challenges threaten to short circuit the democratic process”).
84
Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 399 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
85
Luke Meier, Facial Challenges and Separation of Powers, 85 IND. L.J. 1557, 1557 n.3
(2010) (citing David L. Franklin, Looking Through Both Ends of the Telescope: Facial Challenges
and the Roberts Court, 36 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 689, 697 (2009) (arguing that the Supreme
Court’s “as-applied” preference confirms its “fidelity to the traditional model”); Gillian E. Metzger, Facial and As-Applied Challenges Under the Roberts Court, 36 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 773, 773
(2009) (arguing that “[o]ne recurring theme of the Roberts Court’s jurisprudence to date is its
resistance to facial constitutional challenges and preference for as-applied litigation”); Nicholas
Quinn Rosenkranz, The Subjects of the Constitution, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1209, 1233, 1239 (2010)
(noting that “the Court insists that ‘as-applied’ challenges are the most common and preferred
form of constitutional challenge”).
86
Metzger, supra note 85, at 776.
87
Fallon, supra note 78, at 1330–31.
81
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applied invalidation of laws generally involves a “surgical severing” of constitutionally infirm aspects of the rule. 88
What has generally gone unnoticed is that judicially-created religious
exemptions are functionally a species of as-applied adjudication. This is true
regardless of whether the exemption results from litigation brought under
constitutional free exercise grounds or statutory grounds (such as RFRA). In
both instances, the decision-maker must determine whether a constitutional
right would be infringed by a particular application of an otherwise valid
law. And in both instances, the court will order a remedy that protects the
exercise of the constitutional right, but otherwise leaves the law in place to
apply to other circumstances that may arise. After Smith, it is much more
difficult to obtain successful religious exemptions as a constitutional matter
in many contexts. Viewed in this light, RFRA is essentially restoring a
standard that again allows for as-applied challenges to otherwise valid laws.
For example, the Supreme Court’s decision in Hobby Lobby held that
the Department of Health and Human Services (“HHS”) contraception
mandate unjustifiably burdened a family-held business’s religious exercise
because the government had many other alternatives to accomplish its interest of making contraception more accessible to women. 89 The Court therefore held that RFRA required “an exemption from the rule.” 90 But the Court
did not strike down the HHS mandate wholesale. Thus, this law continues
to apply to all other covered employers, but with surgical exemptions for a
limited group of religious objectors.
Courts have engaged in this same type of adjudication in other successful challenges under RFRA and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”). For example, in 2006, in Gonzales v. O
Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, the Court held that the Controlled Substances Act, although generally constitutional, could not be applied to prohibit the sacramental use of hoasca tea for a religious group.91
And in 2015, in Holt v. Hobbs, the Court concluded that the prison’s ban on
beards, although generally valid, could not be applied to prohibit certain
religiously-motivated beards. 92 In each case, the Court required an exception to an otherwise valid law to protect a religious exercise right.

88
See, e.g., Fallon, supra note 76, at 956 (explaining that as-applied challenges involve the
surgical severing of problematic aspects of a statute from acceptable applications).
89
134 S. Ct. 2751, 2760, 2780–82 (2014).
90
Id. at 2761.
91
546 U.S. 418, 438–39 (2006).
92
135 S. Ct. 853, 859 (2015).
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B. Survey of First Amendment As-Applied Challenges
Of course, the fact that religious exemptions are functionally asapplied challenges does not answer whether those sorts of as-applied challenges still result in unfair preferential treatment for religious liberty claims
if they are offered to facially valid and generally applicable laws. Asapplied challenges in other First Amendment contexts provide a particularly
relevant comparator to assess that question.
The Supreme Court has recognized that “[t]he Free Exercise Clause
embraces a freedom of conscience and worship that has close parallels in
the speech provisions of the First Amendment . . . .” 93 Free exercise protections and free speech protections theoretically serve many similar roles in
our constitutional democracy: they both operate as important safeguards
against government overreach, implicate matters of personal choice and
identity, allow for robust pluralism in our diverse society, help curb dissension and social conflict, and protect minority rights that will not necessarily
be addressed through the political process. 94 As one notable academic has
observed regarding free exercise compared to other constitutional rights, “it
seems intuitively correct that similar rights should be enforced to a similar
extent with similar doctrine.” 95
Prior to Smith, in a number of constitutional cases the Supreme Court
did enforce the First Amendment rights of speech and religious exercise
quite similarly. In Murdock v. Pennsylvania, for example, a city had a generally applicable ordinance that required “all persons canvassing for or soliciting . . . goods, paintings, pictures, wares, or merchandise of any kind” to
pay a fee to the city to obtain a license to solicit. 96 Plaintiffs who had been
arrested under this ordinance were Jehovah’s Witnesses going door to door
distributing religious literature and soliciting donations without ever obtaining such a license. 97 The Plaintiffs argued this government action “deprived
them of the freedom of speech, press, and religion guaranteed by the First
Amendment.” 98
93

Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 591 (1992) (emphasis added).
See, e.g., RANDY E. BARNETT, OUR REPUBLICAN CONSTITUTION 167–68 (2016) (arguing
that enumerated rights like freedom of speech and religious exercise are like “lifeboats” on a sinking ship; the last defense for retained individual rights when structural protections fail); Steven D.
Smith, The Rise and Fall of Religious Freedom in Constitutional Discourse, 140 U. PA. L. REV.
149, 196–98 (1991) (discussing historic rationales for religious freedom).
95
Frederick Mark Gedicks, The Normalized Free Exercise Clause: Three Abnormalities, 75
IND. L.J. 77, 120–22 (2000). But see Coenen, supra note 50, at 467 (arguing that different treatment of speech and religious exercise exemptions is warranted because speech and religious exercise rights “serve different purposes within our constitutional system”).
96
319 U.S. 105, 106 (1943).
97
Id. at 106–07.
98
Id. at 107.
94
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In addressing these claims, the Supreme Court first made clear that the
ordinance at issue in this case was facially valid. 99 Further, the Court observed that the regulation did not discriminate. 100 Thus, the limited question
before the Court was simply whether the ordinance “as construed and applied require[d] religious colporteurs to pay a license tax as a condition to
the pursuit of their activities.” 101
The Court rejected the government’s argument that providing an exemption would put Jehovah’s Witnesses “above the law.” 102 Instead, it explained, “[a] license tax certainly does not acquire constitutional validity
because it classifies the privileges protected by the First Amendment along
with the wares and merchandise of hucksters and peddlers and treats them
all alike. Such equality in treatment does not save the ordinance.” 103 Just
because a law is facially valid does not mean it can be validly enforced
when it butts up against fundamental constitutional rights. At that point, an
ordinance “is not directed to the problems with which the police power of
the state is free to deal.” 104 This is because, as the Court noted, “[f]reedom
of press, freedom of speech, [and] freedom of religion are in a preferred
position.” 105 The Murdock Court thus held that the ordinance’s application
here both curtailed the free press and impinged freedom of religion, and that
these rights “stand or fall together.” 106
As-applied challenges brought under other speech-based claims still
receive fairly similar treatment to that provided under Murdock. 107 But after
Smith, and under the scheme advocated by critics of religious exemptions,
there are at least two contexts where as-applied speech challenges receive
significantly different treatment than similar religious challenges: compelled action and discretionary enforcement or application of a law.

99
Id. at 110 (holding that there was no “question as to the validity of a registration system for
colporteurs and other solicitors”).
100
Id. at 115.
101
Id. at 110.
102
Id. at 116 (internal quotation marks omitted).
103
Id. at 115.
104
Id. at 116.
105
Id. at 115.
106
Id. at 117 (emphasis added). The Court arrived at a similar conclusion in several other
cases dealing with religious solicitation. See, e.g., Follett v. McCormick, 321 U.S. 573, 577 (1944)
(holding that the application of a flat license tax was a violation of the free exercise clause);
Jamison v. Texas, 318 U.S. 413, 414, 417 (1943) (holding that the law could not prohibit dissemination of religious handbills in the street); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 304–07 (1940)
(concluding that the application of a regulation that required a certificate in order to solicit support
for a religion was a violation of the Constitution).
107
Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 117 (1943).
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In these contexts, RFRA can be viewed as an attempt to functionally
restore the as-applied standard that existed prior to Smith and that resembles
First Amendment speech protections.
1. Compelled Action
In Wisconsin v. Yoder, the state had a neutral and generally applicable
law that made school compulsory for students until the age of sixteen. 108
Based on their religious beliefs, Amish families refused to send their children to public school after they completed eighth grade. The government
refused to provide an exemption for these families, and it fined the families
for failing to send their children to school. 109 Plaintiffs offered evidence that
the government’s refusal to provide an exemption would result in “destruction of the Old Order Amish church community as it exists in the United
States today.” 110 The Court noted that:
to agree that religiously grounded conduct must often be subject
to the broad police power of the State is not to deny that there are
areas of conduct protected by the Free Exercise Clause of the
First Amendment and thus beyond the power of the State to control, even under regulations of general applicability. 111
The Court also reasoned that a facially neutral regulation could still violate
the requirement that the Government remain neutral if it applies in a way
that “unduly burdens the free exercise of religion.” 112 In this case, the Court
held that the government failed to meet its burden under strict scrutiny and
justify this religious burden. Thus, the Court provided an exemption. 113
Yoder was one of the cases Smith attempted to banish to the hybridrights category. 114 Professor Gedicks has argued that Smith replaced Yoder
with a standard that “specifies that incidental burdens imposed by a law on
religious practices are subject to rational basis scrutiny so long as the law is
‘generally applicable.’” 115

108

406 U.S. 205, 207 (1972).
Id. at 208.
110
Id. at 212.
111
Id. at 220.
112
Id.
113
Id. at 234–35.
114
See Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 882 (1990) (holding that
“[t]he only decisions in which we have held that the First Amendment bars application of a neutral, generally applicable law to religiously motivated action have involved not the Free Exercise
Clause alone, but the Free Exercise Clause in conjunction with other constitutional protections
such as freedom of speech and of the press”).
115
Gedicks, supra note 95, at 91–94, 113 (quoting Smith, 494 U.S. at 885–86).
109
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The facts of Yoder, however, are remarkably similar to other free
speech cases dealing with compelled expression that remain good law in the
expressive constitutional realm. For example, the canonical compelled
speech case of Wooley v. Maynard presents a good example of different
treatment of free exercise versus speech rights when it comes to exemptions. 116 There, the plaintiff was a Jehovah’s Witness who challenged the
application of New Hampshire’s law requiring the state motto of “Live Free
or Die” on all state license plates. 117 Consequences for violating this law
included fines and even jail time. 118
The Court did not question the state’s ability to generally require drivers to display the state motto. 119 Rather, the Court analyzed whether the facially valid law could be applied to the parties in this case, or whether they
were entitled to an exemption based on their disagreement with the message
on the license plate. 120
Notably, the appellee’s disagreement with the state’s license plate message was based on their sincere “religious objections to the motto.” 121 As
Jehovah’s Witnesses, they believed that they could not advertise the motto
on their vehicles. 122 Thus, their speech objection was coextensive with their
religious objection. Had the claim been analyzed solely under the rational
basis framework some modern scholars advocate as appropriate for religious exemptions, though, the holding of this case likely would have been
that a person’s religion does not “excuse him from compliance with an otherwise valid law prohibiting conduct that the State is free to regulate.” 123
The religious beliefs here also implicated compelled speech, however,
and the Court thus explained that the First Amendment protects the “right to
speak freely and the right to refrain from speaking at all.” 124 The Court applied heightened scrutiny to determine that the State did not have an adequately compelling interest to justify the requirement it had other, narrower
means to accomplish the objective. 125 As a result, the Court held that “the
116

430 U.S. 705, 715–16 (1977).
Id. at 707.
118
Id. at 708–09.
119
Id. at 717.
120
Id. at 713, 717.
121
Id. at 708.
122
Id. at 707.
123
Smith, 494 U.S. at 878–79; see Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 717 (1972). Of course,
there is a possibility that a court would find the law in Wooley v. Maynard not to be generally
applicable because of the exception for government vehicles. Id. at 707 n.1. But along those same
lines, it could be argued that the law in Employment Division v. Smith likewise was not truly generally applicable, because it included an exception for the use of peyote that was “prescribed by a
medical practitioner.” Smith, 494 U.S. at 874 (internal quotation marks omitted).
124
Wooley, 430 U.S. at 714–15.
125
Id. at 716.
117
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State of New Hampshire may not require appellees to display the state motto” and upheld the district court’s injunction protecting them from prosecution. 126 The Court thus upheld an exemption from an otherwise facially valid law. 127
Wooley and Yoder are interesting comparators because both involve a
government action that was not designed to target First Amendment activity,
but both nonetheless compelled activity with serious expressive or religious
implications. Wooley and its progeny also illustrate that in some instances a
law is more likely to be deemed content based (or inappropriately targeted
at protected conduct) and thus deserving of exacting scrutiny in the speech
realm compared to the parallel finding of targeting in the religious realm. 128
No Smith defender would seriously argue that the license plate law in
Wooley targeted Jehovah’s Witnesses either facially or intentionally. 129 Nevertheless, the law did target a certain type of action that the plaintiffs found
objectionable for religious reasons. 130 Under the Smith regime, the government almost certainly would have received a free pass for this law’s “incidental” burden on religious exercise. 131 That is so even though the law
would have also been compelling a type of action that had religious significance to the plaintiffs. Under speech jurisprudence, the Court subjected the
law to the most heightened form of constitutional scrutiny. 132 Indeed, in the
126

Id. at 717. The district court had entered an order enjoining the state “from arresting and
prosecuting (the Maynards) at any time in the future for covering over that portion of their license
plates that contains the motto ‘Live Free or Die.’” Id. at 709 (internal quotation marks omitted).
127
See id. at 717.
128
To be sure, even the Court’s more generous approach to finding non-neutrality in the
speech realm has been plagued with inconsistencies and faced heavy criticism. See, e.g., Erwin
Chemerinsky, Content Neutrality as a Central Problem of Freedom of Speech: Problems in the
Supreme Court’s Application, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 49, 50 (2000) (arguing that “the Court has erred
in developing the principle of content neutrality,” and its “applications are inconsistent with the
very reasons that this principle is at the core of First Amendment analysis”); R. George Wright,
Content-Neutral and Content-Based Regulations of Speech: A Distinction That Is No Longer
Worth the Fuss, 67 FLA. L. REV. 2081, 2083 (2015) (noting that “[s]cholars have recognized a
range of important problems associated with the jurisprudence of supposedly content-neutral and
content-based regulations of speech for some time”). Thus, a more systematic review of courts’
approach in intermediate scrutiny cases, as well as cases labeling a law as “content based” would
be necessary to draw more concrete conclusions.
129
Smith, 494 U.S. at 878.
130
Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 707 (1972).
131
Smith, 494 U.S. at 878.
132
See Israel Klein, FDA Puffery: Smoking Out the Constitutionality of Graphic Cigarette
Warning Labels, 24 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 201, 220 (2013) (detailing the
various standards used by the courts in analyzing speech infringement claims); see also Caroline
Mala Corbin, Speech or Conduct? The Free Speech Claims of Wedding Vendors, 65 EMORY L.J.
241, 281 (2015) (stating that Wooley involved strict scrutiny rather than intermediate scrutiny used
for merely expressive conduct); Brian Galle, Free Exercise Rights of Capital Jurors, 101 COLUM.
L. REV. 569, 581 n.57 (2001) (noting the application of “strict scrutiny review” in major free
speech cases); B. Ashby Hardesty, Jr., Joe Camel Versus Uncle Sam: The Constitutionality of
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speech realm, laws have been deemed content-based, and thus deserving of
“exacting scrutiny,” simply because they required a speaker to provide the
“content” of the speaker’s identity. 133
Some scholars have tried to justify less searching scrutiny for religious
claims by drawing a distinction between the government having less interest
in prohibiting what people say (which implicates speech) than what they do
(which implicates religious exercise). One such scholar, for example, argues
for a “weaker test applicable to religious exemption claims” because
“[w]hen people are asking for freedom not just to speak, or to be treated
equally without regard to race, but to act, the law must often intrude on that
freedom.” 134 Yet many First Amendment cases demonstrate that such a distinction is often illusory. Consider the law in Wooley, which the Court described as compelling a certain message (a motto on a license plate), and
thus warranting heightened scrutiny. But again, the plaintiffs’ objection to
compelled speech at issue in Wooley was coextensive with the plaintiffs’
religious exercise—the sincere religious objection to displaying the state
motto on a license plate. 135
Similarly, in other speech cases like the Barnette decision, the plaintiffs’
objection to compelled speech was also coextensive with the plaintiffs’ religious exercise—a sincere objection to saluting the flag for religious reasons. 136 Even in the contraception mandate cases—which are held up by
some critics as the textbook example of religious action gone too far—some
plaintiffs raised similar objections to the contraception mandate based on
Graphic Cigarette Warning Labels, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 2811, 2828 (2013) (noting laws that
“compel” or “restrict” speech are subject to strict scrutiny); Bryan M. Haynes et al., Compelled
Commercial Speech: The Food and Drug Administration’s Effort to Smoke Out the Tobacco Industry Through Graphic Warning Labels, 68 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 329, 341 (2013) (same); Carissa
Byrne Hessick & F. Andrew Hessick, Recognizing Constitutional Rights at Sentencing, 99 CALIF.
L. REV. 47, 93–94 & n.235 (2011) (positing that the strict scrutiny standard applied to compelled
speech should be applied to sentencing decisions); Ashley Peterson, Comment, Lighting a Fire
Under Free Speech: The FDA’s Graphic Attempts to Reduce Smoking Rates, 48 U. RICH. L. REV.
799, 818 n.151, 826–27 (2014) (noting that the regulation of tobacco companies’ speech is still
limited under a First Amendment analysis despite the health risks of tobacco use); Nadia N.
Sawicki, Compelling Images: The Constitutionality of Emotionally Persuasive Health Campaigns,
73 MD. L. REV. 458, 492 (2014) (analyzing the issue of “professionals’ First Amendment rights”
under the strict scrutiny standard). But see Leslie Gielow Jacobs, Pledges, Parades, and Mandatory Payments, 52 RUTGERS L. REV. 123, 183–84 (1999) (noting that the Court seemed to apply
elements of both strict scrutiny and mid-level balancing review).
133
See McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 345, 347 (1995) (concluding that
restrictions on handing out leaflets expressing a controversial political view was deserving of the
greatest constitutional protection).
134
Eugene Volokh, A Common-Law Model for Religious Exemptions, 46 UCLA L. REV.
1465, 1500 (1999).
135
Wooley, 430 U.S. at 708.
136
319 U.S. 624, 629 (1943).
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speech and association concerns. 137 Attempting to categorize “speech” as entirely distinct from religious “action” often amounts to little more than a confusing fiction. As Justice Neil Gorsuch noted in a somewhat similar context:
[t]he distinction blurs in much the same way the line between acts
and omissions can blur when stared at too long, leaving us to ask
(for example) whether the man who drowns by awaiting the incoming tide does so by act (coming upon the sea) or omission (allowing the sea to come upon him). Often enough the same facts
can be described both ways. 138
2. Discretionary Enforcement or Application of a Law
The Supreme Court has provided as-applied exemptions from facially
valid laws regulating—or prohibiting—speech in problematic ways. But
these types of discretionary or open-ended laws often leave religious exercise rights vulnerable as well, particularly for religious minorities.
For example, in the speech context, in Cohen v. California, the Supreme Court upheld a challenge to a law imposing criminal liability for a
breach of the peace. 139 This law had been applied to punish Cohen for wearing a jacket with an offensive message inside the corridor of a courthouse. 140 Cohen was arrested and convicted for “maliciously and willfully
disturbing the peace or quiet of any neighborhood or person by offensive
conduct,” and the California Court of Appeals affirmed, finding that he had
engaged in “offensive conduct.” 141
The Court rejected a facial challenge to the law, observing that the “statute [was] applicable throughout the entire State” 142 and was not facially
“overbroad or vague.” 143 But the issue remained whether the state had power
to apply such a law to prohibit protected speech. 144 The Court determined
that, as applied to the facts, the law violated Cohen’s freedom of expression
137

See, e.g., Complaint at 39, Eternal Word Television Network, Inc. v. Sebelius, No. 13-cv521 (S.D. Ala. Oct. 28, 2013) (arguing that “[d]efendants’ actions thus violate [Eternal Word
Television Network’s] right to be free from compelled speech as secured to it by the First
Amendment of the United States Constitution”); Complaint at 54, Little Sisters of the Poor Home
for the Aged v. Sebelius, No. 13-CV-02611 (D. Colo. Sept. 24, 2013) (arguing that “Defendants’
actions thus violate the Plaintiffs’ right to speak, and the Plaintiffs’ right to be free from compelled speech, as secured to them by the First Amendment of the United States Constitution”).
138
Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012, 2025–26 (2017)
(Gorsuch, J., concurring in part) (citations omitted).
139
403 U.S. 15, 16–17 (1971).
140
Id. at 16.
141
Id. at 16–17.
142
Id. at 19.
143
Id. at 24 n.5.
144
Id. at 19.
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rights. 145 The Court explained that the state’s “undifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance . . . is not enough to overcome the right to freedom of
expression.” 146 The Court thus reversed Cohen’s conviction, holding that “the
state may not, consistently with the First and Fourteenth Amendments, make
the simple public display here involved of this single four-letter expletive a
criminal offense.” 147 Cohen was thus entitled to an exemption from the otherwise lawful application of the state’s breach of the peace statute.
Because constitutional religious exemptions are much more limited
post-Smith, religious exemptions under RFRA ensure that problematic applications of neutral laws, like that in Cohen, do not simply go unnoticed
for vulnerable religious minorities. For example, in 2014, McAllen Grace
Brethren Church v. Salazar involved the discretionary application of the
Bald and Golden Eagle Protection Act. 148 Under this law, an undercover
federal agent infiltrated a sacred Native American powwow and cut the celebration short when he noticed that tribal members possessed eagle feathers. 149 The agent interrogated the powwow participants, confiscated their
feathers, and threatened them with criminal prosecution unless they signed
papers abandoning their feathers. 150 Without the ability to seek a religious
exemption under RFRA, the Native Americans in this case would have been
left with much less effective alternatives for recourse from the government’s application of this facially valid statute. 151
3. What About Intermediate Scrutiny?
Since the 1960s, the Court has frequently applied intermediate scrutiny
when assessing as-applied challenges to neutral and generally applicable
laws. 152 One prominent example comes from United States v. O’Brien, in
145

Id. at 18.
Id. at 23 (citing Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 508 (1969)).
147
Id. at 26.
148
764 F.3d 465, 468 (5th Cir. 2014).
149
Id.
150
Id. at 468–69; see Religious Freedom Restoration Act and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on the Constitution and Civil Justice of
the Committee on the Judiciary House of Representatives, 114 Cong. 8–9 (2015) (statement of Lori
Windham, Senior Counsel, Becket Fund for Religious Liberty) (describing the federal agent’s actions—including refusing to leave a Native American ceremony—as part of “Operation Pow-Wow”).
151
McAllen Grace, 764 F.3d at 471–80 (holding that under an RFRA analysis the government
is held to a strict scrutiny standard to justify applying the statutory burden to someone “whose
sincere exercise of religion is being seriously impaired”).
152
Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 719–20, 726 (2000); Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491
U.S. 781, 791, 798–99 (1989); United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 176–78 (1983); Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 563–64 (1980); Ashutosh
Bhagwat, The Test That Ate Everything: Intermediate Scrutiny in First Amendment Jurisprudence,
2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 783–84, 786–87 (citing United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376–77
(1968)); see also Susan Dente Ross, Reconstructing First Amendment Doctrine: The 1990s
146
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which the Supreme Court held that “incidental restrictions” on speech rights
that resulted from neutral laws were subjected to intermediate scrutiny.153
O’Brien dealt with an across the board ban on draft-card destruction, which
was used to prosecute a war protestor who burned his draft card as a form
of symbolic dissent. 154
Because of the similar factual context of incidental burdens on speech
versus exemption claims from generally applicable laws, some scholars
have questioned whether intermediate scrutiny would be a more appropriate
standard of review for religious exemptions from generally applicable
laws. 155 A thorough analysis of the virtues and consistency of this intermediate scrutiny approach in the speech realm is beyond the scope of this article, 156 but two observations here are worth making.
First, many scholars correctly observe that the regime under Smith
looks nothing like intermediate scrutiny. 157 Intermediate scrutiny generally
requires courts to engage in a searching inquiry of whether the government
action impinging on speech rights is justified. Professor Gedicks has noted
that “it is not unusual for the Court to invalidate laws under [intermediate
scrutiny].” 158 For example, in McCullen v. Coakley, anti-abortion protesters
challenged a Massachusetts restriction limiting speech on public land near
abortion clinics. 159 Even though the Supreme Court engaged in intermediate
scrutiny analysis, it unanimously ruled against the government and in favor
[R]Evolution of the Central Hudson and O’Brien Tests, 23 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 723,
727 (2001).
153
391 U.S. 367, 377.
154
Id. at 369.
155
Professor Corvino has asserted that “RFRA ought to be modified to require an ‘intermediate scrutiny standard’ for incidental burdens,” which would “bring it in line with how we treat
other fundamental freedoms.” CORVINO ET AL., supra note 2, at 51; see also id. at 32 (arguing that
“incidental burdens on religion” should “trigger intermediate scrutiny”). Notably, such a legal
standard would look much different than the standard Corvino defends earlier in the same book,
where he asserts that Smith was correctly decided. Id. at 31; see also James M. Oleske, Jr., A Regrettable Invitation to “Constitutional Resistance,” Renewed Confusion over Religious Exemptions, and the Future of Free Exercise, 20 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1317, 1326, 1355 n.202
(2017) (arguing that Smith ought to be modified to allow intermediate scrutiny for religious exemption requests).
156
For a treatment of this subject, see Coenen, supra note 50, at 443–52.
157
See Gordon, supra note 38, at 107, 109 n.149 (noting that “Smith held that the free exercise clause requires no balancing of interests at all . . . . [T]he Court refused to consider any intermediate levels of constitutional scrutiny. It concluded that [because] compelling interest scrutiny
is too strict, no scrutiny at all should apply . . . . [Because] the prescription on its eyeglasses was
too strong, the Court preferred to be sightless. . . .”); McConnell, supra note 38, at 1128 (“[J]ust
because the [pre-Smith free exercise] test was not so strong as ‘compelling’ does not mean that the
Court failed to apply heightened scrutiny in its previous decisions. There is no support in the precedents for the Court to replace the prior test with nothing more than the toothless rationality review that is applicable to all legislation.”).
158
Gedicks, supra note 95, at 90.
159
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2525 (2014).
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of speech rights. 160 Similarly, commercial speech challenges have frequently resulted in at least intermediate scrutiny and as-applied invalidation of
government action, even when the law was not struck down facially. Since
the 1990s, the Court has aggressively protected commercial speech and has
struck down regulations on the advertising of compound drugs, state restrictions on tobacco advertising, and a ban on labels stating the alcoholic
content of beer. 161
This searching review thus looks nothing like the mere “rational basis
review” many describe Smith as providing. 162 As Professor Oleske explains,
Smith was problematic because it shifted Supreme Court jurisprudence to
the extreme of “applying no scrutiny” to “laws incidentally burdening individual religious practices . . . .” 163 Thus, the Smith framework is anomalous
in that it fails to at least provide intermediate scrutiny for religious exercise.
Second, even when dealing with laws that the Court describes as completely neutral and generally applicable, sometimes the Supreme Court employs exacting scrutiny for speech rights. For example, in United States v.
Grace, the Court analyzed a law that included a broad prohibition on expressive activity on the Supreme Court grounds. 164 Some protesters wanted
to carry signs, banners, or devices on the public sidewalks surrounding the
Supreme Court, and they challenged the law. 165 Although the Court
acknowledged that this law was “facially content-neutral,” it determined
that it was still unconstitutional “as-applied” to conduct in which plaintiffs
in the case wished to engage. 166 The Court explained, “[w]e hold that under
the First Amendment the section is unconstitutional as applied to those
sidewalks.” 167 Thus, the plaintiffs were given an exemption from this content-neutral law based on what looked like quite exacting scrutiny in the
free speech context.
The Court followed a similar approach in the context of the federal
wiretap act in the 2001 case of Bartnicki v. Vopper. 168 There, the Court dealt
with the question of whether the federal wiretap act could be used to punish
160

Id. at 2530, 2541.
See Bhagwat, supra note 152, at 795 nn.80–82 (2007) (citing Thompson v. W. Med. Ctr.,
535 U.S. 357, 360 (2002); Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525 (2001); Rubin v. Coors
Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476 (1995)); see also Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 475
U.S. 1, 8 (1986) (collecting cases where corporate speech protections have resulted in the invalidation of government action).
162
See, e.g., State v. Arlene’s Flowers, Inc., 389 P.3d 543, 560 (Wash. 2017) (citing Emp’t
Div., Dep’t of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 872 (1990)).
163
Oleske, supra note 155, at 1355.
164
461 U.S. at 181.
165
Id.
166
Id. at 181 n.10, 183.
167
Id. at 183.
168
532 U.S. 514, 535 (2001).
161
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the publication of an illegally intercepted cellular telephone call. 169 The
Court began by observing that the federal prohibition on intercepting telephone calls was hardly new; rather “federal law has prohibited such disclosures since 1934.” 170 The Court found that the act was a facially constitutional and “content-neutral law of general applicability.” 171 And the Court
found that both the federal wiretap act and its Pennsylvania analogue were
violated by the interception and publication at issue in Bartnicki. 172 That
meant that—at least in the ordinary course—petitioners would be “entitled
to recover damages from each of the respondents” for the violations.173
Thus, the Court determined whether it would provide an exception to the
normal application of the wiretap law for the particular circumstances at
issue. 174
To analyze this question, it is notable that the Court did not apply the
O’Brien intermediate scrutiny standard. In fact, three dissenting justices
argued that the Court should have simply applied O’Brien and upheld the
application of the law. 175 Instead, the Court expressed concern that “enforcement of th[e] provision in these cases . . . implicates the core purposes
of the First Amendment because it imposes sanctions on the publication of
truthful information of public concern.” 176 As a result, the Court indicated
that the government justification must be of “the highest order,” and no
such justification existed for this application of the law. 177 The Court in
Bartnicki thus created an exemption to protect constitutional interests from
an otherwise valid and generally applicable law, and it did so with a searching scrutiny based on the unique First Amendment burdens caused by the
law’s application. 178
Thus, even when dealing with laws described as neutral and generally
applicable, in the speech context courts sometimes engage in a searching
review beyond what is arguably required under O’Brien because of the
169

Id. at 517.
Id.
171
Id. at 526.
172
Id. at 525.
173
Id.
174
Id.
175
Id. at 544–45 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
176
Id. at 533–34 (majority opinion).
177
See id. at 528 (quoting Smith v. Daily Mail Publ’g Co., 443 U.S. 97, 103 (1979)).
178
See also id. at 535 (Breyer, J., concurring) (joining opinion because “I agree with its narrow holding limited to the special circumstances present here”) (joined by O’Connor, J.). Not
surprisingly, other courts have therefore continued to apply § 2511(1)(c) to other circumstances.
See, e.g., Doe v. Smith, 429 F.3d 706, 708 (7th Cir. 2005) (holding that plaintiff properly stated
claim for violation of the Wiretap Act based on intentional disclosure of personal video); Lewton
v. Divingnzzo, 772 F. Supp. 2d 1046, 1048 (D. Neb. 2011) (attorney in custody case violated
Wiretap Act by disclosing secret recordings captured by device hidden in child’s toy).
170
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unique burdens on speech. Arguably, this is quite similar to how a religious
exemption framework operates when the application of a generally applicable law results in unique burdens on religious exercise.
4. What About Antidiscrimination Laws and Dignitary Harms?
The prospect of exemptions to anti-discrimination laws has prompted
some of the most virulent backlash against religious exemptions to generally applicable laws. 179 One of the frequent objections raised is that such exemptions are particularly concerning because of the dignitary harm they
would inflict on third parties. 180 No doubt the prospect of refusal of service
in any context has the potential to be deeply offensive and hurtful, particularly when it involves goods or services related to one’s identity and significant personal life events. 181 And the government’s interest in prohibiting

179
See generally HAMILTON, supra note 57 (describing religious exemptions as perilous and
threatening the rule of law); Bagenstos, supra note 57, at 137–40; Terri R. Day & Danielle
Weatherby, LGBT Rights and the Mini RFRA: A Return to Separate but Equal, 65 DEPAUL L.
REV. 907, 911–12 (2016) (discussing “the tension and interplay between those advocating for
LGBT-inclusive laws and those seeking protection under state, mini RFRAs from what they characterize as religious discrimination to resist the trend toward LGBT equal rights”); Dhooge, supra
note 57, at 58–59 (“[A]ny conflicts between religious liberty asserted by secular businesses and
access to goods and services must be resolved in favor of the government’s compelling interest in
guaranteeing full and non-discriminatory access for all persons. Such a result does not denigrate
religion.”); Lederman, supra note 57, at 419 (arguing that “there is widespread fear in some quarters—and presumably hope in others—that such claims might become a template for similar
claims, pursuant to federal or state RFRAs or analogous state constitutional provisions, for religious exemptions from laws that prohibit discrimination in employment, or in the provision of
public accommodations, on the basis of sexual orientation”); Lupu, supra note 66, at 98 (asking if
RFRA could “now be construed to protect religiously motivated employment discrimination based
on sexual orientation, or discrimination by wedding vendors, merchants in other contexts, or government officials against same-sex couples”); NeJaime & Siegel, supra note 57, at 2561–63 (noting concern that religious exemptions could be granted from public accommodations laws); Sepper, supra note 44, at 26 (noting that “[p]ublic accommodations laws generally apply with full
force to all businesses serving the public, religiously affiliated or not”); Gasper, supra note 41, at
414–16; Griffin, supra note 57.
180
See, e.g., Leslie Meltzer Henry, The Jurisprudence of Dignity, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 169,
189–90 (2011) (describing five different types of dignitary harm). Litigants in Masterpiece
Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission also argued that to frame the denial of service as being about the ability to “obtain goods or services . . . both misunderstands the nature of
the government interest at stake and trivializes the profound dignitary harm that people experience
when they are turned away from a business because of who they are.” Brief in Opposition at 24,
Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, No. 16-111 (Nov. 28, 2016). For a
response to many of these arguments, see generally Carl H. Esbeck, Do Discretionary Religious
Exemptions Violate the Establishment Clause?, 106 KENTUCKY L.J. (forthcoming 2018), https://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2952370 [https://perma.cc/RQK4-36J9].
181
Some scholars have also argued that religious exemption claims based on complicity are
particularly hurtful for third parties, because such claims involve a moral judgment or indication
that this third party’s behavior is sinful. See, e.g., NeJaime & Siegel, supra note 57, at 2561–63.
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dignitary harms is valid when that interest does not come into conflict with
other constitutional rights.
However, in the free speech context, the Supreme Court has consistently held that a government’s desire to protect people from emotional
harm—even far more acute emotional harm than is present in many of the
wedding vendor cases—does not constitute a compelling government interest. 182 For example, it is difficult to imagine more excruciating humiliation,
degradation, or emotional harm than that endured by the father who saw
Westboro Baptist Church picketers with signs stating “God Hates Fags,”
“You’re Going to Hell,” and “God Hates You” at the funeral of his son, a
Marine killed in Iraq in the line of duty. 183 Notably, the plaintiffs’ behavior
in Snyder v. Phelps constituted action that was simultaneously religious and
expressive.
At trial, a Maryland jury found that the Church’s protest met the applicable standards for the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress
(“IIED”), and it returned a verdict of over $10 million for the marine’s
family. 184 Despite this significant emotional distress, the Supreme Court
upheld an as-applied challenge to the state tort law in an 8-1 decision. 185
The Court explained that although Westboro had “inflict[ed] great
pain,” freedom of speech protections were a defense against state tort
claims and prohibited the Court (or the jury) from “react[ing] to that pain by
punishing the speaker.” 186 Because the speech at issue was “entitled to ‘special protection’ under the First Amendment,” 187 the Court set aside the jury
verdict and held that the First Amendment precluded recovery for IIED. 188
The Court made clear, though, that it was providing a modest and “narrow”
ruling that swept “no more broadly” than the specific facts of the as-applied
challenge before it. 189 Thus, not only did the Court provide a limited exemption to a neutral and generally applicable tort law based on speech protections, it emphasized that this is the preferred mode of modest adjudication. 190
The Court in Snyder also emphasized the “bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment” that “the government may not prohibit the ex182

See Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 71 (1983) (noting that the Supreme
Court has “stated that offensiveness was classically not a justification validating the suppression
of expression protected by the First Amendment” (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted)).
183
Snyder, 562 U.S. at 448.
184
Id. at 450.
185
Id. at 460–61.
186
Id. at 451, 461.
187
Id. at 458.
188
Id. at 460.
189
Id. (citation omitted).
190
See id.; see also Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 303, 311 (reversing the conviction of a religious
solicitor based on an as-applied challenge to a breach of the peace statute).
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pression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or
disagreeable.” 191 Any other result would “effectively empower a majority to
silence dissidents simply as a matter of personal predilections.” 192
Nor is the government entitled to a unique trump card to avoid emotional harm in the context of anti-discrimination laws. In Hurley v. IrishAmerican Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston, the Court addressed
whether state law prohibiting discrimination in public accommodations
could require a private parade to admit a parade group that wished to advocate an LGBT message with which the parade disagreed. 193 The Court began its analysis by addressing the facial validity of the public accommodation law. 194 Specifically, the parade organizers argued that the public accommodation law was “overbroad” and “unconstitutionally vague.” 195 The
Supreme Court rejected this argument, noting that “[p]rovisions like these
are well within the State’s usual power to enact,” and “they do not, as a
general matter, violate the First or Fourteenth Amendments.” 196 Indeed, the
Court praised such laws as having a “venerable history,” 197 and noted that
the state law prohibition targeted “the act of discriminating against individuals in the provision of publicly available goods, privileges, and services on
the proscribed grounds.” 198 Nor was this statute facially “unusual in any
obvious way, since it [did] not, on its face, target speech or discriminate on
the basis of its content.” 199 The Supreme Court thus made crystal clear that
it was dealing with a facially valid law in Hurley.
The question, then, was whether the parade organizers were entitled to
an exemption from the application of the otherwise valid anti-discrimination
law in this case. 200 The lower court held that any impact on the parade
group’s expressive rights was merely “incidental” and “no greater than necessary to accomplish the statute’s legitimate purpose of eradicating discrimination.” 201 On this latter point, the Supreme Court reversed, holding that the
generally applicable state law had been applied in such a way as to infringe
191

Snyder, 562 U.S. at 458 (citing Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989)); see also
Bolger, 463 U.S. at 71 (holding that “we have consistently held that the fact that protected speech
may be offensive to some does not justify its suppression”); Nat’l Socialist Party of Am. v. Vill. of
Skokie, 432 U.S. 43, 43–44 (1977) (per curiam) (holding unconstitutional the Illinois Supreme
Court’s refusal to stay a prohibition on the right to express anti-semitic messages).
192
Cohen, 403 U.S. at 21.
193
515 U.S. 557, 561, 566 (1995).
194
Id. at 571–72.
195
Id. at 564–65.
196
Id. at 572.
197
Id. at 571.
198
Id. at 572.
199
Id.
200
Id. at 566.
201
Id. at 563 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
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on “the choice of a speaker not to propound a particular point of view, and
that choice is presumed to lie beyond the government’s power to control.”202
Thus, the application of the public accommodation law here infringed upon
First Amendment protections, and the parade organizers were entitled to an
exemption. 203
The Supreme Court engaged in nearly identical analysis in Boy Scouts
of America v. Dale. 204 There, the New Jersey state court held that the Boy
Scouts organization was subject to the state public accommodation law, it
was not exempt under any express exemptions, and it had violated the law
by revoking the membership of a scout leader because he was a selfprofessed gay man. 205 In reviewing this holding, the Supreme Court observed that the New Jersey statute defined “place of public accommodation”
very broadly. 206 This breadth did not invalidate the statute on a facial basis,
but it did mean that “potential for conflict between state public accommodations laws and the First Amendment rights of organizations has increased.” 207 Thus, the Court analyzed “whether the application of New Jersey’s public accommodations law to require that the Boy Scouts accept
Dale as an assistant scoutmaster runs afoul of the Scouts’ freedom of expressive association.” 208 The Court concluded that it did, reversed the New
Jersey state court, and provided an exemption from New Jersey’s antidiscrimination law based on this as-applied challenge. 209
Both Hurley and Dale are fascinating because they result in precisely
the types of exemptions to anti-discrimination laws in the speech context
that many scholars find unthinkable in the religious context. In Dale, it was
surely emotionally distressing for a gay scout leader to be expelled from the
Boy Scouts; indeed, unlike Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil
Rights Commission, which involved a one-time and brief interaction, Dale
was expelled from a program that had been a major part of his life for nearly as long as he could remember. 210 Yet the Court determined that here the
government’s interest was insufficient to trump the Boy Scouts association
rights. 211
202

Id. at 575, 577–81; see also Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 659 (2000) (holding
that the government did not have a compelling government interest in applying public accommodation law to force the Boy Scouts to admit a gay scout leader).
203
Hurley, 515 U.S. at 573.
204
530 U.S. at 646.
205
Id.
206
Id. at 656–57.
207
Id. at 657.
208
Id. at 656.
209
Id.
210
Id. at 644–45.
211
Id. at 661; see also Hurley, 515 U.S. at 574 (holding that the exclusion of the LGBT group
was “hurtful,” but still protected).
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In the anti-discrimination conflicts currently percolating, including in
Masterpiece Cakeshop, religious objectors have generally raised both free
speech and religious exercise claims in which they object to providing artistic services that contradict their beliefs about sexuality. 212 But none of these
business owners have engaged in targeted expression that comes close to
the intentionally hurtful speech at issue in Snyder, nor the total exclusion of
an individual from all aspects of an organization as in Dale. Rather, in Masterpiece Cakeshop for example, the baker was willing to sell a wide range
of baked goods to LGBT individuals; his objection was limited to creating a
custom-designed wedding cake for a same-sex wedding. 213 This is true of
the run of the wedding vendor cases. 214 In fact, in most of these cases the
would-be-customer must take the additional step of deducing implied disapproval from the denial of a particular artistic service. 215 It is inherently
contradictory to suggest that implicit disapproval is somehow more likely to
inflict dignitary harm than a direct and purposefully hateful expression of
disapproval allowed in the speech context.
One might argue that Hurley and Dale are not analogous, because
Masterpiece Cakeshop involves a denial of a commercial service offered to
212
See, e.g., Memorandum Opinion and Order on Cross, Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock,
No. CV-2008-06632 (N.M. Dist. Ct. Dec. 11, 2009), 2009 WL 8747805 (raising free speech and
religious claims); Complaint at 1–2, Amy Lynn Photography Studio, LLC v. City of Madison, No.
2017-cv-000555 (Wis. Cir. Ct. Mar. 7, 2017); In re Melissa Elaine Klein, 2015 WL 4868796, at
*32–34 (Or. Bureau of Labor & Indus. July 2, 2015) (Nos. 44-14, 44-15) (same).
213
Craig v. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc., 370 P.3d 272, 276–77, 280–81 (Colo. App. 2015),
cert. denied sub nom. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, No. 2015SC738,
2016 WL 1645027 (Colo. Apr. 25, 2016), cert. granted sub nom. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v.
Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 137 S. Ct. 2290 (2017) (mem.).
214
See Gifford v. McCarthy, 23 N.Y.S.3d 422, 429 (App. Div. 2016) (noting that objectors
“would happily host wedding receptions, parties, or other events for couples in same-sex relationships,” just not weddings) (internal quotation marks omitted)); State v. Arlene’s Flowers, Inc., 389
P.3d 543, 550 (Wash. 2017) (holding that a florist had always served “gay and lesbian customers
in the past for other, non-wedding-related flower orders”); Klein, 2015 WL 4868796, at *35, *51
(finding that objector claimed refusal of service “was not on account of . . . sexual orientation, but
on . . . objection to participation in the event for which the cake would be prepared”); Complaint
¶¶ 22, 76–79, Country Mill Farms, LLC v. City of East Lansing, No. 1:17-cv-00487, 2017 WL
2387921 (W.D. Mich. May 31, 2017) (arguing that the operator of a farm “gladly s[old] produce
to all comers at the Market” and had “employed people from a wide variety of racial, cultural, and
religious backgrounds, including members of the LGBT community”); Brief in Chief of Appellant, Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, 2010 N.M. App. Ct. Briefs LEXIS *1, at *6–7 (N.M.
Ct. App. June 3, 2010) (arguing that “[w]hat is crucial for Elane Photography is the message conveyed by its photos, not the sexual orientation of the people in its photos.” (internal record citations omitted)); Complaint ¶ 7, Amy Lynn Photography, No. 2017-cv-000555 (arguing that photographer “serves individuals of every sexual orientation and every political belief”).
215
For example, in Arlene’s Flowers, Baronelle Stutzman took the would-be customer by the
hand and, after expressing her regard for him, told him she could not arrange flowers for his wedding because of her religious beliefs. But she did not express any disapproval of her customer or
his relationship. See Brief of Appellants at 13, Arlene’s Flowers, 389 P.3d 543 (Wash. Oct. 16,
2015) (No. 91615-2), 2015 WL 12632392.
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the public. Such an argument must be broken down to its parts. First, as to
payment received, the Supreme Court has long held in the speech context:
“It is well settled that a speaker’s rights are not lost merely because compensation is received; a speaker is no less a speaker because he or she is
paid to speak.” 216 And in Hobby Lobby, seven of the nine Supreme Court
justices have at least implicitly recognized that the same principle is true for
religious exercise. 217
Is there, then, something uniquely unassailable about the government’s
interest when a service is being offered to the public? Or, as some scholars
argue, must “any conflicts” asserted by public accommodations “be resolved in favor of the government’s compelling interest in guaranteeing full
and non-discriminatory access for all persons?” 218 To answer those questions, one must also answer the following: Could the government require a
baker who supports Black Lives Matter to bake a Confederate flag-themed
cake for a rally being held by the Aryan Nations church? Or could the government force LGBT business owners to bake a cake for a Westboro Baptist
Church protest? Does the fact that these bakers offer similar cakes to the
public really change the analysis?
It turns out these are not simply hypothetical thought experiments. After
the recent neo-Nazi demonstrations in Charlottesville, a swarm of businesses
reacted by refusing to continue providing services to white supremacist organizations. 219 A salon refused to continue styling the hair of a politician who
216

Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 801 (1988).
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2787 (2014) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (only Justice Sotomayor joined the portion of Justice Ginsburg’s dissent that argued that corporations cannot exercise religion).
218
Dhooge, supra note 57, at 58–59; see also Joseph William Singer, We Don’t Serve Your
Kind Here: Public Accommodations and the Mark of Sodom, 95 B.U. L. REV. 929, 930–33 (2015)
(analyzing the connection between private property rights and anti-discrimination laws).
219
See, e.g., Bill Chappell, Neo-Nazi Site Daily Stormer Is Banned by Google After Attempted
Move from GoDaddy, NPR: THE TWO-WAY (Aug. 14, 2017, 8:30 AM), http://www.npr.org/sections/
thetwo-way/2017/08/14/543360434/white-supremacist-site-is-banned-by-go-daddy-after-virginiarally [https://perma.cc/9TDM-YM7F] (noting that a white supremacist site was banned by GoDaddy
after Virginia rally); Tracy Jan & Elizabeth Dwoskin, Silicon Valley Escalates Its War on White Supremacy Despite Free Speech Concerns, WASH. POST (Aug. 16, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.
com/business/economy/silicon-valley-escalates-its-war-on-white-supremacy-despite-free-speechconcerns/2017/08/16/842771b8-829b-11e7-902a-2a9f2d808496_story.html?utm_term=.3ee823f
7eb96 [https://perma.cc/C5WC-88YC]; Blake Montgomery, PayPal, GoFundMe, and Patreon Banned
a Bunch of People Associated with the Alt-Right. Here’s Why, BUZZFEED NEWS (Aug. 2, 2017, 9:01
AM), https://www.buzzfeed.com/blakemontgomery/the-alt-right-has-a-payment-processor-problem?
utm_term= .sjNDdwQ8Y#.alq53Qga4 [https://perma.cc/DS5U-6JCJ]; Caroline O’Donovan, Uber
Bans Racists Too, BUZZFEED NEWS (Aug. 21, 2017, 12:10 PM), https://www.buzzfeed.com/
carolineodonovan/uber-is-also-willing-to-ban-white-supremacists?utm_term=.jlMoBP3qM#.ryKQ
AoZPg [https://perma.cc/C3E8-94ZF]; Erik Ortiz et al., Ahead of Far Right Wing Ralley in Virginia, Airbnb Cancels Accounts, NBC NEWS (Aug. 8, 2017, 5:38 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/
news/us-news/ahead-far-right-wing-rally-virginia-airbnb-cancels-accounts-n790716 [https://perma.
217
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would not take a position supportive of LGBT rights. 220 A gay coffee shop
owner recently refused to serve a group of pro-life activists, ejecting them
from his store. 221And in the relevant factual context for Masterpiece
Cakeshop, the Colorado Commission allowed three bakers (including LGBT
business owners) to refuse a religious customer’s request to create custom
cakes with religious messages criticizing same-sex marriage. 222 The Commission also admitted that a baker could decline to create a cake with a design or
symbol that was “offensive,” including “a white-supremacist message for the
Aryan Nation,” or “a cake denigrating the Koran . . . .” 223 If one thinks that
any of these businesses are justified in denying their services to individuals,
groups, or events to which they object, then one must acknowledge that the
government does not have an unassailable interest in coercing the provision
of any product or service that is already offered to the public.
To be sure, there are some cases dealing with services or products offered in the public sphere where the government would prevail over First
Amendment objections. But in the public accommodation context, the
foundational government interest capable of trumping First Amendment
objections is not avoiding dignitary harms or conscripting public vendors
into government service. It is the government’s interest in “removing the
barriers to economic advancement and political and social integration that
have historically plagued certain disadvantaged groups.” 224 And the unanimous Supreme Court in Hurley has already pointed to factors that should be
assessed when the Court must balance First Amendment rights with state
cc/L2JP-VX58]; Matthew Rozsa, After Charlottesville, Spotify Is Pulling White Supremacist Music from Its Platform, SALON (Aug. 17, 2017, 10:59 AM), http://www.salon.com/2017/08/17/hategroups-spotify-is-pulling-white-supremacist-music/ [https://perma.cc/8LKW-KLKT]; Nick Statt,
Apple Pay Is Dropping Support for Websites That Sell White Supremacist Merchandise, THE
VERGE (Aug. 16, 2017, 6:51 PM), https://www.theverge.com/platform/amp/2017/8/16/16159310/
apple-pay-drops-support-white-supremacist-neo-nazi-merchandise [https://perma.cc/EM7J-QAMR].
220
Erik Hayden, Stylist Refuses to Cut New Mexico Governor’s Hair Over Gay-Marriage
Stance, TIME (Feb. 23, 2012), http://newsfeed.time.com/2012/02/23/stylist-refuses-to-cut-newmexico-governors-hair-over-gay-marriage-stance/ [https://perma.cc/29TV-7VNV].
221
Douglas Ernst, Christian Activists Booted from Seattle Coffee Shop: ‘I’m Gay. You Have to
Leave,’ WASH. TIMES (Oct. 6, 2017), https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2017/oct/6/christianactivists-booted-from-seattle-coffee-sho/; see also Stephanie Barclay, Religious Baker Who Refused
to Make a Wedding Cake for Gay Couple Deserves Protection Whether You Agree with Him or Not,
PHILA. INQUIRER (Jan. 19, 2018, 10:49 AM), http://www.philly.com/philly/opinion/commentary/
masterpiece-cakeshop-supreme-court-scotus-gay-wedding-cake-20180119.html [https://perma.cc/
7K88-RCUT].
222
Craig v. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc., 370 P.3d 272, 282 n.8 (Colo. App. 2015), cert. denied sub nom. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, No. 2015SC738, 2016
WL 1645027 (Colo. Apr. 25, 2016), cert. granted sub nom. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo.
Civil Rights Comm’n, 137 S. Ct. 2290 (2017) (mem.).
223
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, app. at 56a–58a, 78a, Masterpiece Cakeshop, No. 16-111.
224
Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 626 (1984).
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interests. 225 Specifically, (1) does the public accommodation “disclaim any
intent to exclude [a class of individuals] as such” (which would create a
more significant barrier to economic or political advancement), or does the
public accommodation have a more discreet objection to something like a
particular “message” or event; 226 and (2) is the public accommodation “an
abiding monopoly of access,” or does the would-be customer have a “fair
shot” at obtaining the service elsewhere? 227
The answers to these questions will vary depending on the evidence
the government has marshaled regarding a market failure it needs to address, the economic reality in which the conflict arises, and the breadth of
the First Amendment objection at issue. When courts balance these important interests, the religious objector will not always win. 228 But the important point is that in these balancing scenarios, the religious objector’s
rights should be given some weight. The theory advanced by critics under
their view of Smith would give religious objections virtually no weight at
225

Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 659 (2000).
Hurley, 515 U.S. at 572. The government will have a stronger interest in combatting the
type of class-based market failures approximating the Jim Crow South discrimination, which originally motivated widespread public accommodation laws. See Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v.
United States, 379 U.S. 241, 252–53 (1964) (recounting obstacles to service for African Americans prior to the Civil Rights Act of 1964); John D. Inazu, A Confident Pluralism, 88 S. CAL. L.
REV. 587, 603 (2015) (“There remains . . . a crucial difference between the race-based discrimination against African Americans in the Jim Crow South and any other form of discrimination or
exclusion in our country. The pervasive impediments to equal citizenship for African Americans
have not been matched by any other recent episode in American history. Our country has harmed
many people . . . . But the systemic and structural injustices perpetrated against African Americans—and the extraordinary remedies those injustices warranted—remain in a class of their
own.”).
227
Hurley, 515 U.S. at 572–78. Other state supreme courts have similarly explained that a
government can demonstrate a compelling government interest where some market failure is preventing a class of individuals from obtaining a good or service. For example, in a conflict between
public accommodation laws and free exercise rights in Massachusetts, the Supreme Judicial Court
explained that the government must prove that accommodating the religious objectors would “significantly imped[e] the availability” of the requested service because a “large percentage of units”
were unavailable to the would-be customers. Attorney Gen. v. Desilets, 636 N.E.2d 233, 240
(Mass. 1994). The court rejected a general interest in “eliminating discrimination” and noted that
“the analysis must be more focused.” Id. at 238. Illinois and Michigan have adopted the same
approach as Massachusetts. See Jasniowski v. Rushing, 685 N.E.2d 622, 622 (Ill. 1997) (reversing
a ruling requiring a religious landlord to lease to a cohabiting couple); McCready v. Hoffius, 593
N.W.2d 545, 545 (Mich. 1999) (same). For an economic analysis about why a focus on market
access is important in this fraught anti-discrimination debate, see generally Nathan B. Oman,
Doux Commerce, Religion, and the Limits of Antidiscrimination Law, 92 IND. L.J. 693 (2017).
228
Easier cases would be where the government has demonstrated a monopoly or a market
failure regarding an important service. For example, if a religious couple owned a hotel in a remote location and they were unwilling to house LGBT individuals, the government would have a
stronger case for trumping any First Amendment rights. Similarly, the Desilets court indicated that
the government could have prevailed if it had presented evidence showing a “significant housing
problem” where “a large percentage of units are unavailable to cohabitants.” 636 N.E.2d at 240.
226
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all—resulting instead in an automatic victory for the government anywhere
it can point to an abstract interest in prohibiting discrimination. 229 Notably,
this crabbed reading of the Free Exercise Clause as necessarily giving way
to any anti-discrimination interest has already been unanimously rejected by
the Supreme Court in the context of federal and state employment antidiscrimination laws. 230 Thus, the principled alternative is that the government should carry the burden of demonstrating a need to remove barriers to
economic and political advancement under strict scrutiny in this context,
and that scrutiny should be just as strict regardless of whether the objection
that triggers this analysis is based on speech or religious grounds. 231
Finally, Professor Case argues that “[a]dvocates of exemptions from
public accommodation laws for service providers who refuse to provide
flowers or cake for same-sex wedding celebrations have yet to explain
whether and why the claims of these Christian bakers and florists are more
worthy of accommodation” than other groups. 232 But perhaps the more relevant question for Professor Case and other objecting scholars is this: why are
Christian bakers and florists less worthy of accommodation than groups who
would engage in nearly identical behavior for equally expressive, but not necessarily religious, purposes? And more broadly, why should religious asapplied challenges be treated less favorably than other First Amendment asapplied challenges?
III. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF RELIGIOUS VERSUS SPEECH CLAIMS
The cases surveyed above demonstrate that courts already provide exemptions in other First Amendment contexts, even in the context of generally
applicable laws. 233 Thus, providing religious exemptions does not “elevate[]
religious freedom to a preferred position among First Amendment rights.” 234
But what of Justice Scalia’s concern that religious exemptions pose a
special threat of a society “courting anarchy?” Is less protective treatment
229
See, e.g., State v. Arlene’s Flowers, Inc., 389 P.3d 543, 562 (Wash. 2017) (citing Emp’t
Div., Dep’t of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 872 (1990)) (citing Smith as providing mere
rational basis review for religious exercise, and deferring without question to the government’s
abstract interest in combatting discrimination).
230
See Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171, 188–89
(2012) (holding that that constitutional right under the religion clauses trumped the application of
the Americans with Disabilities Act).
231
The Supreme Court has made clear that a government interest that is found lacking in one
context does not transform into a compelling interest when it arises in the religious context. See
Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 429–30 (holding that whether strict scrutiny is triggered by the Free Speech
Clause or RFRA, “the consequences are the same”).
232
Case, supra note 1, at 485.
233
See supra notes 93–232 and accompanying text.
234
LUPU & TUTTLE, supra note 55, at 11.
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of religious objections warranted based on something else problematic
about religious objections compared to other First Amendment claims? Is
there something about the infinite variety of practices of faiths that distinguishes religion as giving rise to more voluminous risks than those posed by
speech or association, particularly post Hobby Lobby’s heightened protection for such rights? For example, as discussed above, critics such as Professor Case argue that Hobby Lobby creates a “risk of havoc” without any
“stopping point . . . .” 235 Further, Case suggests that Hobby Lobby has
“open[ed] up the floodgates to a host of new potential claims for religious
exemption by a host of different kinds of service providers.” 236 Similarly,
Professor Corvino suggests that “many find Hobby Lobby worrisome” because religious conduct that receives protection for “exemption and accommodation purposes” is “expansive and expanding,” and has a unique
“pervasiveness” with an “endless variety of religious scruples.” 237 Professor
Leslie Griffin argues that because of “Hobby Lobby,” the “broad reading of
RFRA . . . will encourage many future lawsuits and undermine more civil
liberties.” 238 She also asserted that “[a]lmost anything can be turned into a
claim of ‘cooperation with evil’” and “all federal laws are now subject to
challenge, with the possibility of every citizen becoming ‘a law unto himself’ until the rule of law is undermined.” 239 Professor Elizabeth Sepper argues that “[t]he Hobby Lobby decision throws open the courtroom door to
corporations and hands them the now-powerful weapon of corporate conscience to fight off regulation that protects the full and equal citizenship of
the people.” 240 And Professor Marshall asserts that “[t]he risk that Hobby
Lobby invites flimsy but readily sustainable RFRA claims by entities engaged in commercial activity then should be apparent. A financial incentive
combined with a high likelihood of success is a dangerous mix.” 241 This line
of thinking, if true, counsels that a religious exemption regime, with “an
235

Case, supra note 1, at 486 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 487.
237
CORVINO ET AL., supra note 2, at 38, 46, 47–50.
238
Griffin, supra note 60, at 673.
239
Id. at 687–88; see also Chemerinsky & Goodwin, supra note 61, at 1133–34 (“This decision will lead to much broader challenges. Christian Scientists, for example, will claim that they
do not have to provide any health insurance to their employees.”); Garfield, supra note 61, at 825
(arguing that “[b]y tipping the scales so drastically in favor of religious objectors, Alito put out a
welcome mat for religious objections by corporations”); Robertson, supra note 61, at 569 (arguing
that “the ruling casts a shadow over all public health regulation, given that virtually any objector
can cloak their objection in religious garb”); Stephens, supra note 61, at 4 (arguing that “[t]he
Court’s significant expansion of religious liberty doctrine in [Burwell v. Hobby Lobby] invites
businesses to seek exemptions from nondiscrimination laws such as Title VII, the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, and the Americans with Disabilities Act, as well as other laws, which provide
workplace protections to women, such as the Family and Medical Leave Act”).
240
Sepper, supra note 62, at 233.
241
Marshall, supra note 8, at 120.
236
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endless chain of exemption demands,” is a distinct threat to the rule of law
because it will result in a tidal wave of religious claimants striking down
government action at every turn. 242
To examine this claim, we conducted a modest empirical analysis to
assess (1) the likelihood that religious exemptions result in government action being struck down under RFRA, and how that rate has changed since
Hobby Lobby; and (2) the volume of religious objection cases being brought
compared to speech-based cases, and whether the volume of religious
claims seem to have increased dramatically post Hobby Lobby. Notably, we
provide the first nation-wide RFRA survey of its kind since Hobby Lobby.
Our findings contradict the notion that religious objections are much
more likely to prompt a court to strike down government action under
RFRA after Hobby Lobby. 243 Compared to previous scholarship assessing
government win rates in this area, Hobby Lobby does not appear to have
significantly changed the government’s win rate in the last three years. Our
findings also indicate that cases dealing with religious objections to laws
are less pervasive than cases dealing with other expressive First Amendment claims. 244 These findings apply to all federal cases, as well as the cases specifically at the Supreme Court level. The data also does not indicate a
trend of dramatic growth in the volume of religious cases post Hobby Lobby. More time and data will be necessary to confirm these results. Additionally, no statistical regression analysis has been performed to isolate the effect of variables, and the findings in this Article are thus at best suggestive.
A. Methodology
We utilized three different methods to analyze religious objection
claims compared to other speech and association claims, both in terms of
volume and likelihood of striking down government action. Each of these
methods is discussed in turn below.
We also compared our findings to the helpful empirical research of
Professor Adam Winkler, who reviewed all federal cases from 1990 to 2003
dealing with strict scrutiny, including cases dealing with suspect classifications, speech, religious liberty, fundamental rights, and freedom of association. 245 Though somewhat dated (and inapplicable to questions about how
242
Ira C. Lupu, Where Rights Begin: The Problems of Burdens on the Free Exercise of Religion, 102 HARV. L. REV. 933, 947 (1989); see also supra notes 152–178 and accompanying text.
243
See infra notes 267–292 and accompanying text.
244
See infra notes 267–292 and accompanying text.
245
See generally Adam Winkler, Fatal in Theory and Strict in Fact: An Empirical Analysis of
Strict Scrutiny in the Federal Courts, 59 VAND. L. REV. 793 (2006). Other authors have also surveyed RFRA cases in the Tenth Circuit recently. See generally Luke W. Goodrich & Rachel N.
Busick, Sex, Drugs, and Eagle Feathers: An Empirical Study of Federal Religious Freedom Cas-
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Hobby Lobby changed the pervasiveness of religious objections), Professor
Winkler’s research serves as a useful benchmark.
1. New RFRA Survey Methodology
To assess how Hobby Lobby has impacted the government’s win rate
in RFRA cases, we surveyed all federal RFRA court cases available in
Westlaw that have been brought in the three-year period since Hobby Lobby. 246 We analyzed the court rulings to determine how frequently the court
ruled for the plaintiff on a RFRA claim versus how frequently the court
ruled for the government. The universe of RFRA cases was created using
two types of searches. The first was a general Westlaw search for RFRA
terms in the federal cases database:
• Search: advanced: (“religious freedom restoration act” RFRA
“42 U.S.C. s 2000bb”) & DA(aft 06-30-2014 & bef 07-012017).
o Results: 478 cases.
For our second method, we used the Westlaw citing references feature
to identify any cases citing to the five statutory sections of RFRA for the
same three-year time period. We then cross-referenced both search results,
removing any duplicate decisions. Only two new cases resulted from this
second citing reference search method, bringing the total universe of cases
to 480 cases. 247
es, 48 SETON HALL L. REV. 353 (2018) (surveying Tenth Circuit religious liberty cases from
2012–2017).
246
The relevant time period was June 30, 2014–July 17, 2017. Some applications of RFRA
necessarily evaded the data set if they unreported cases, or not part of Westlaw’s database. We
assume that such cases are more likely to be government wins, and that a court decision overturning government action would result in a reported case. This may mean that the government win
rate is in actuality even higher. We excluded the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons
Act (“RLUIPA”) cases from the dataset because the standard for RLUIPA was not clearly established as being as protective as RFRA until the Supreme Court’s decision a year after Hobby Lobby in Holt v. Hobbs. To avoid potential data skewing that would result partially through the threeyear period based on that evolving standard, and where the purpose of this analysis is to assess the
impact of Hobby Lobby, those RLUIPA cases were excluded.
247
The search terms and results for this method included the following:
• Search: Federal cases under citing references for 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb from July 1, 2014
– June 30, 2017.
o Results: 190 cases, but only 1 additional new case.
• Search: Federal cases under citing references for 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 from July 1,
2014 – June 30, 2017.
o Results: 180 cases, but only 1 additional new case.
• Search: Federal cases under citing references for 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-2 from July 1,
2014 – June 30, 2017.
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We analyzed a judicial decision as a single application of RFRA, regardless of the number of judges on the panel. Preliminary rulings and decisions that were subsequently reversed or affirmed on appeal were collected
but, unless otherwise specified, were excluded from the reported results to
avoid double counting. 248 Additionally, only decisions in the relevant threeyear period were counted, and it is possible that some of these decisions
could be subsequently reversed. With the help of excellent research assistance, we manually reviewed all 480 cases to ensure that any decisions not
addressing RFRA on the merits were also excluded. 249 This brought the
universe of unique cases addressing RFRA on the merits to a total of 101
cases. Many of the other cases were disposed of on procedural grounds or
other legal claims.
Unsurprisingly, there were a number of cases (thirty-one to be precise)
dealing with essentially the same challenge to the “contraception mandate”
of the Affordable Care Act. These cases arose in different jurisdictions but
addressed the same issue that was ultimately addressed by the Supreme
Court either in Hobby Lobby (for the for-profit organizations) or in the consolidated appeal in Zubik v. Burwell (for the nonprofit organizations). 250 In
light of the government’s announcement to resolve these cases through regulatory action after the Supreme Court’s decision in Zubik, we decided that
the most conservative course was to treat these cases as separate government losses. 251 We made this decision given that many religious exemption
o Results: 30 cases, but 0 additional new cases.
• Search: Federal cases under citing references for 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-3 from July 1,
2014 – June 30, 2017.
o Results: 16 cases, but 0 additional new cases.
• Search: Federal cases under citing references for 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-4 from July 1,
2014 – June 30, 2017.
o Results: 30 cases, but 0 additional new cases.
248
The empirical analysis by Adam Winkler on strict scrutiny applications similarly analyzed
court rulings, but excluded cases that were preliminary or that were addressed by another court on
appeal. Winkler, supra note 245, at 844–45.
249
A decision was considered “on the merits” if the court made a determination regarding
whether there was a sincere religious belief, a substantial burden on religious exercise, the government had a compelling interest, or the regulation was the least restrictive means. This included
when the court discussed whether plaintiff alleged enough facts to support his RFRA claim (i.e. at
the motion to dismiss stage). Not considered “on the merits” included cases where the RFRA
claim was dismissed because the defendant was a state or private actor, or the plaintiff did not
exhaust administrative remedies.
250
See HHS Mandate Information Central, BECKET, http://www.becketlaw.org/researchcentral/hhs-info-central/ [https://perma.cc/D3A9-HZJ5] (compiling a database of cases challenging the HHS mandate); see, e.g., Zubik v. Burwell, 136 S. Ct. 1557, 1560–61 (2016) (vacating
Third, Fifth, Tenth, and D.C. Circuit Courts decisions that held HHS constitutional, and remanding to address the issue of employers providing notice of their religious objections).
251
In May 2016, the Supreme Court unanimously overturned lower court rulings against
religious objectors, ordered the government not to fine the objectors, and said the lower courts
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objectors are likely particularly concerned about these cases. Arguably,
these cases could be treated as one case, or excluded altogether. Thus, we
presented alternative findings treating these cases as two government losses
(one loss for the government against for-profit challenges in Hobby Lobby,
and one loss for the government against nonprofits in Zubik), or excluding
these cases completely.
A final point of clarification is in order. The purpose of this methodology is to examine how courts have applied strict scrutiny under RFRA since
Hobby Lobby; it is not to determine how strict scrutiny might affect litigants, legislators, government officials, or others. Our goal was not to determine how strict scrutiny impacts the decision of lawmakers to adopt
laws, government officials to enforce laws, or litigants to bring, settle, or
appeal lawsuits. That is not something that could be measured by this data. 252 Thus, this case survey does not capture other possible significant impacts Hobby Lobby may have had on the willingness of government officials to enforce certain laws or the willingness of litigants to bring lawsuits.
2. Targeted Comparative Searches Methodology
For our second method, we wanted to find a way to compare the volume of speech cases to religious exercise cases. Religious exercise cases
include constitutional cases and thus present a broader universe of claims
than just RFRA cases. That is why an additional search method was required to assess case volume beyond our new RFRA survey. 253 Initially, we
assessed a snapshot of all cases that have been brought since the Hobby
Lobby decision in June 2014. To do this we ran three targeted searches in
Westlaw to identify the approximate number of religious cases compared to
other expressive First Amendment cases. We first ran searches using
Westlaw’s key number system to assess how many cases were assigned
Westlaw’s “speech and expression” key number versus its “religious exer-

should provide the government with an opportunity “to arrive at an approach going forward that
accommodates the petitioners’ religious beliefs.” Zubik, 136 S. Ct. at 1560. In May 2017, the
President issued an executive order directing the Department of Health and Human Services
(“HHS”) and other agencies to protect religious ministries from the HHS mandate. Exec. Order
No. 13,798, 82 Fed. Reg. 21,675 (May 4, 2017). Further government action to finalize policy
changes to the contraception mandate is anticipated.
252
The data’s failure to account for primary behavior is an admitted weakness, but the nature
of the relevant question makes it almost impossible to collect the type of data that would be necessary to analyze the effects of Hobby Lobby on primary behavior.
253
If we had limited our dataset to just RFRA cases, this would have skewed the religious
claims and indicated they were even smaller compared to other First Amendment expressive cases
than they already are.
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cise” key number. 254 Second, we ran searches with relevant speech or religious-exercise search terms appearing at least four times in the body of a
case. 255 Third, we ran searches with the same speech or religious-exercise
search terms appearing in the Westlaw summary of the case. 256 Each search
was limited to the time period of June 30, 2014, to June 30, 2017. 257 Each
of these searches has its own shortcomings in perfectly capturing the universe of speech or free exercise cases in the last three years, but together
these searches triangulate to provide a likely relevant data point for the
comparative volume of cases brought over the last three years. 258
It is possible that this data, as a snapshot in time, would not reveal a
sharp upward trend in the growth of religious cases. Thus, to analyze trends
over time in volume, we used the targeted search language for the Westlaw
key number system and ran that search limited by year for each year dating
back to 1946. 259 We chose this year because (as discussed below) the modern
Spaeth Database begins in 1946 as well. 260 We compared speech to religious
cases over time in absolute terms, and also as a percentage of all reported cases by year. We used the number of all reported cases by year that was provided in the Lexis database. Westlaw does not report more than ten-thousand
cases in any search category, but Lexis does not cap the number of cases pro-

254
For speech cases, the following search was used in all state and federal cases: “adv:
TO(92xviii) & DA(aft 06-30-2014 & bef 07-01-2017).” This search references the Westlaw key
number 92, Section XVIII—Freedom of Speech, Expression, and Press, k1490-k2309. For religious exercise cases, the following search was used in all state and federal cases: “adv: TO(92xiii)
& DA(aft 06-30-2014 & bef 07-01-2017).” This search references the Westlaw key number 92,
Section XIII—Freedom of Religion and Conscience, k1290-k1429.
255
For speech cases, the following search was used in all state or federal cases: “adv: ATLEAST4(“freedom #of speech”) ATLEAST4(“freedom #of press”) ATLEAST4(“freedom #of
association”) ATLEAST4(“freedom #to associate”) & DA(aft 06-30-2014 & bef 07-01-2017).”
For religious exercise cases, the following search was used in all state or federal cases: “adv: ATLEAST4(“freedom #of relig!”) ATLEAST4(rfra) & DA(aft 06-30-2014 & bef 07-01-2017).”
256
For speech cases, the following search was used in all state or federal cases: “adv:
SY((free! /5 speech! press associat!)) & DA(aft 06-30-2014 & bef 07-01-2017).” For religious
exercise cases, the following search was in all state or federal cases: “adv: SY((relig! /5 exerc!)
rfra (free! /5 relig!)) & DA(aft 06-30-2014 & bef 07-01-2017).”
257
All relevant searches were run between October 19, 2017, and October 24, 2017. We understand that the numbers that come back in Westlaw searches may be subject to minor change,
given that Westlaw is continually adding new cases to its library.
258
As a starting matter, Westlaw does not claim to include all unpublished cases in its searchable databases.
259
For counting purposes, our year began on July 1, the day after Hobby Lobby was decided,
and it ended on June 30. So, a search for one year of Westlaw key number cases would look like
this: “adv: (TO(92xviii)) & DA(aft 06-30-1945 & bef 07-01-1946).”
260
We used the Westlaw key number for our search over time because this category was
created by a third party, and thus less susceptible to a critique that we relied on biased search
terms.
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vided in search results. 261 Thus, for the numerator we used the number of religious or speech Westlaw key cases in a given year, and for the denominator
we used the number of all reported cases in that same year. We then displayed
the findings from this methodology in two different graphs.
3. Spaeth Database Methodology
Finally, although the findings of the first two methods provide information about volume and win rates for all federal cases, some may wonder
whether a comparatively larger proportion of religious cases percolate
through the court system to the Supreme Court, and what type of win rates
those religious cases enjoy. We thus compared religious exercise versus
other expressive Supreme Court cases using Harold J. Spaeth’s U.S. Supreme Court Database. 262 This database codes all Supreme Court decisions
from 1946 to 2016 based on numerous factors, including the particular legal
issue, as well as the party that was successful. This coding “makes amassing
data on the Court’s First Amendment decisions a relatively straightforward
task.” 263 We first looked at all of the speech and association Supreme Court
cases in which the government was clearly successful, either as the petitioner or the respondent. 264 We then did the same thing for cases coded as religious exercise cases. 265 Notably, this Spaeth coding of a winning party does
not ensure that a religious or speech claim, respectively, is the winning issue
on the merits. Thus, the value of these win rates is limited.
In terms of providing a fully representative dataset, there are some obvious limitations with the Spaeth database. Most notably, the database is
limited to Supreme Court decisions, which are not representative of other
261

To obtain the number of all reported cases from Lexis, we used the term “cite(lexis)”
across all Federal and State cases. All cases in the Lexis database are given Lexis citations, so this
brought back a total amount of the number of reported cases in the Lexis database. We ran this
“cite(lexis)” search year by year, and used this number for the denominator.
262
Modern Database: 2017 Release 01, WASH. UNIV. LAW: THE SUPREME COURT DATABASE
(Aug. 14, 2017), http://supremecourtdatabase.org/data.php [https://perma.cc/XVZ9-QW6Q].
263
Id.; see, e.g., Lee Epstein & Jeffrey A. Segal, Trumping the First Amendment?, 21 WASH.
U. J.L. & POL’Y 81, 92 (2006) (discussing the use of the database to analyze other aspects of First
Amendment cases).
264
For this coding under the “Legal Provisions” section of the database, we selected the
“Constitutional Amendment” section and then the “First Amendment” subsection. We then selected both the “association” category and the “speech, press, or assembly” category. We then ran
searches under this category where the government was coded as a party, and assessed win-rates
based on when the government was the winning party.
265
For this coding under the “Legal Provisions” section of the database, we selected the
“Constitutional Amendment” section and then the “First Amendment” subsection. We then selected the “free exercise of religion” category. We similarly ran searches under this category where
the government was coded as a party, and assessed win-rates based on when the government was
the winning party. We also added the three RFRA cases to this category.
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federal cases. 266 Still, this database does provide a useful data point for the
volume of meritorious cases that the Supreme Court is interested in addressing for speech compared to religious exercise issues. The modern database
time-period ends in 2017 (the 2016 term).
B. Findings
Our findings do not indicate that government win rates have undergone
a dramatic change since Hobby Lobby. Though the data does not assess the
impact of Hobby Lobby on primary behavior, it does contradict the fear of
some critics that Hobby Lobby will “encourage many future lawsuits,” 267
“throw[] open the courtroom door to corporations,” 268 and “invite[] flimsy
but readily sustainable RFRA claims . . . with a high likelihood of success.” 269
Additionally, our findings indicate that reported cases dealing with
speech claims are much more voluminous than reported cases dealing with
religious claims, both in absolute terms and as a percentage of all reported
cases. The trend over time indicates that religious claims are decreasing as a
percentage of all reported cases, not increasing as some critics fear.
1. New RFRA Survey Findings
In our new survey of all federal cases involving a RFRA claim in the
three years since Hobby Lobby, the government won in fifty out of 101 cas266

According to the Supreme Court’s own website, its current caseload is over 10,000 cases,
but plenary review is only granted “in about 100 cases per Term,” so less than 1% of all appeals.
The Justices’ Caseload, SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, https://www.supremecourt.
gov/about/justicecaseload.pdf [https://perma.cc/DSD3-CQJE]; see also David R. Stras, The Supreme Court’s Gatekeepers: The Role of Law Clerks in the Certiorari Process, 85 TEX. L. REV.
947, 967, 987 (2007) (book review) (reporting the decrease in cases that the Supreme Court decides on the merits, and noting that the Court granted review over 3% of the time in the early
1980s but has done so less than 1% of the time since the October 1999 Term, although the number
of certiorari petitions has steadily increased); The Supreme Court, 2009 Term—The Statistics, 124
HARV. L. REV. 411, 418 tbl.II(B) (2010) (observing that the Court granted only 0.9% of 8,131
petitions for review in its 2009 Term).
267
Griffin, supra note 60, at 673.
268
Sepper, supra note 62, at 233.
269
Marshall, supra note 8, at 120. Our findings are consistent with analysis by journalists and
HHS that there have been very few corporations that have taken advantage of a contraception
mandate exemption. See, e.g., Moral Exemptions and Accommodations for Coverage of Certain
Preventive Services Under the Affordable Care Act, 82 Fed. Reg. 47,838–857 (interim final rules
with request for comment Oct. 13, 2017) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 54; 29 C.F.R. pt. 2590; 45
C.F.R. pt. 147); Jennifer Haberkorn, Two Years Later, Few Hobby Lobby Copycats Emerge, POLITICO (Oct. 11, 2016, 5:19 PM), http://www.politico.com/story/2016/10/obamacare-birth-controlmandate-employers-229627 [https://perma.cc/DT69-6SCH] (“Politico obtained the accommodation notices filed by employers between [January and March] 2014 . . . . Thirty of the entities are
nonprofits and 22 are for-profits.”).
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es, which is a government win rate of fifty percent. 270 If contraception mandate cases are treated as just two consolidated government losses addressed
by the Supreme court in Hobby Lobby and Zubik (one for the for-profit cases, and one for the nonprofit cases), then the government enjoys a higher
win rate of sixty-nine percent. If the thirty-one contraception mandate cases
are excluded altogether, the government’s win rate is seventy-one percent. 271
Our findings on win rates are similar to those from the Winkler survey. 272 Specifically, of all of the rights Professor Winkler surveyed, government action was most likely to succeed in the context of strict scrutiny
applied to religious claims, with a fifty-nine percent success rate—“more
than double the mean of the other doctrinal categories.” 273 This number increased even further to a seventy-four percent government win rate for religious claims challenging a generally applicable law. 274 In Professor Winkler’s findings, speech claims were the most likely to result in striking government action, with the government action at issue surviving a speech
challenge only twenty-two percent of the time. 275 Notably, the government
action was even less likely to survive a speech challenge than an equal protection challenge. 276
Table 1 277
New RFRA survey findings (counting all
contraception mandate cases as separate
government losses)
New RFRA survey findings (counting all
contraception mandate cases as two consolidated losses)
New RFRA survey findings (excluding all
contraception mandate cases)

Government Win Rate
50%
69%
71%

270
The underlying data set for this Table is available at https://docs.google.com/
spreadsheets/d/1wPhJNDX00p5PImroZ7rIUXx_NGxdj2ojTk8AVxIfDUw/edit#gid=1535894163
(request permission to view from author).
271
See infra note 277 and accompanying text (Table 1).
272
Winkler, supra note 245, at 844–45.
273
Id. at 857–58.
274
Id. at 861. This finding by Winkler is not a perfect comparison, as it was not limited to
RFRA. Id. at 857–58. Additionally, “generally applicable law” is an undefined legal term subject
to debate, and thus difficult to classify. See Gedicks, supra note 95, at 113 (noting that Employment Division v. Smith did not define “general applicability”).
275
Winkler, supra note 245, at 844.
276
Id.
277
This Table is permanently available at http://www.bc.edu/content/dam/bc1/schools/law/
pdf/law-review-content/BCLR/59-5/barclay-rienzi-graphics.pdf [https://perma.cc/YD43-EGQR].
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59%
74%
22%

Our findings do not demonstrate a dramatic drop in government win
rates post Hobby Lobby. The data does not address relevant primary behaviors, such as the choice of government officials not to adopt or enforce certain laws. 278 But our findings do shed light on how judges continue to enforce strict scrutiny under RFRA post Hobby Lobby. More time and data are
necessary to draw more concrete conclusions.
2. Targeted Comparative Searches Findings
In our targeted searches to assess volume of religious versus speech
cases, we began by looking at volume in the three years since Hobby Lobby. 279 In our findings, the number of speech and expressive cases that the
searches returned generally dwarfed the number of free exercise cases in
similar search results. Under each search result, speech cases outnumbered
religious claims at a ratio of anywhere from 3:1 to 6:1.
These findings are consistent with Professor Winkler’s findings, where
the volume of speech-based claims was notably greater than the volume of
religious claims. Specifically, Winkler found that speech claims constituted
by far the largest category of strict scrutiny cases—222 of 459. 280 There
were thirty-three additional association cases, totaling 255 expressive cases. 281 In contrast, religious claims in Professor Winkler’s database accounted for merely seventy-three of the 459 claims. 282
Table 2 283
Speech and
Expressive Cases

Religious
Exercise Cases

Ratio

278
Notably, under the new Trump administration, the Attorney General recently issued guidance that is much more protective of religious exercise under RFRA, and will likely result in much
less agency action that is hostile towards religious exercise under this administration. See generally Memorandum from Jeffrey Sessions, Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, for All Executive
Departments and Agencies (Oct. 6, 2017). That sort of primary behavior is not measured by our
RFRA case survey.
279
The date range filter used for all of these searches was July 1, 2014 to June 30, 2017.
280
Winkler, supra note 245, at 844–45.
281
Id. at 815.
282
Id.
283
This Table is permanently available at http://www.bc.edu/content/dam/bc1/schools/law/
pdf/law-review-content/BCLR/59-5/barclay-rienzi-graphics.pdf [https://perma.cc/YD43-EGQR].
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1,796

305

6:1

1,274

333

4:1

639

188

3:1

222

73

3:1

When analyzing the trends of the Westlaw key number cases over
time, our findings are not consistent with the allegation that religious claims
are undergoing a dramatic expansion, particularly as compared to speech
cases. Table 3 illustrates both types of Westlaw key number cases tracked in
absolute terms over time. 284
Table 3 285

Table 4 illustrates both types of Westlaw key number cases tracked as
a percentage of all reported cases over time. The percentage of religious
cases appears to have stayed fairly constant over the years.
284

See infra note 285 and accompanying graphic.
This Table is permanently available at http://www.bc.edu/content/dam/bc1/schools/law/
pdf/law-review-content/BCLR/59-5/barclay-rienzi-graphics.pdf [https://perma.cc/YD43-EGQR].
The
underlying
data
set
is
available
at
https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1vbW_8E7orAkidtxcNAtQHy3s60k8TVx
LLOkiKGgpe_8/edit#gid=878012463 (request permission to view from author).
285
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Table 4 286

Expression vs Religion as a Percentage of
All Reported Cases
0.6000%
0.5000%
0.4000%
0.3000%
0.2000%
0.1000%
1946
1949
1952
1955
1958
1961
1964
1967
1970
1973
1976
1979
1982
1985
1988
1991
1994
1997
2000
2003
2006
2009
2012
2015

0.0000%

Expression %

Religion %

Perhaps most interesting is that if we hone in on the years immediately
preceding Hobby Lobby and then immediately following that court decision,
a fitted line graph in Table 5 illustrates that the slope of religion cases as a
percentage of the reported caseload appears to be slightly decreasing.
Table 5 287
0.0250%
0.0200%
0.0150%
0.0100%
0.0050%
0.0000%
2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

2018

3. Spaeth Database Findings
According to the Spaeth database from 1946 to 2016, there were a total
of 461 First Amendment cases, and of these 378 dealt with speech or asso286
This Table is permanently available at http://www.bc.edu/content/dam/bc1/schools/law/
pdf/law-review-content/BCLR/59-5/barclay-rienzi-graphics.pdf [https://perma.cc/YD43-EGQR].
287
This Table is permanently available at http://www.bc.edu/content/dam/bc1/schools/law/
pdf/law-review-content/BCLR/59-5/barclay-rienzi-graphics.pdf [https://perma.cc/YD43-EGQR].
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ciation issues. The government was coded as a party in 344 of these cases.
In contrast, during the same period of time there were only thirty-two free
exercise cases (thirty-five with three RFRA cases included). 288 The government was coded as a party in twenty-nine of these cases. 289 Thus, the
speech-based claims outnumbered religious claims by a ratio of more than
10:1. Overall, across the last seven decades, the court ruled in favor of the
government in forty-one percent of the free speech and association cases in
which it was a party. In contrast, the court ruled in favor of the government
at the higher rate of forty-five percent of the twenty-nine free exercise cases
in which the government was a party. In other words, the government is less
likely to win in the context of speech and association cases than in religious
exercise cases. But this difference is not substantial, and likely not statistically significant at the Supreme Court level. These findings are interesting
in that they indicate that a far greater number of speech-based cases than
religious cases are meritorious enough to percolate to the Supreme Court.
Table 6 290
Supreme Court Cases

Speech and Association Cases

Religious Exercise
Cases

Number brought between
1946 and 2016

344

29

Government win rate

41%

45%

In sum, our findings are consistent with the conclusion that speech
cases are much more pervasive than religious cases. Additionally, our findings are not consistent with the notion that religious objections are dramatically increasing in volume, or are much more likely to prompt a court to
strike down government action under RFRA after Hobby Lobby. Compared
to the work by Professor Winkler, Hobby Lobby does not appear to have
significantly changed the government’s win rate.
C. Jurisprudential Explanation for Empirical Findings
The legal constraints on religious exercise claims may help explain
why religious exemption requests are not as voluminous or as successful as
critics fear. Although some scholars critique religious claims because truth
288
289

cases.

Modern Database: 2017 Release 01, supra note 262.
Of these cases, twenty-six were constitutional free exercise cases and three were RFRA

290
This Table is permanently available at http://www.bc.edu/content/dam/bc1/schools/law/
pdf/law-review-content/BCLR/59-5/barclay-rienzi-graphics.pdf [https://perma.cc/YD43-EGQR].
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claims about such beliefs are “insulated from ordinary standards of evidence,” 291 the same could be said of truth claims implicated by other First
Amendment rights. What standard of evidence could be said to apply, for
instance, to the truth claims of pornography, nearly nude dancing, videos of
animals being crushed, flag burning, or swastikas? Yet all of those are examples of speech objections that require the most heightened scrutiny our
constitutional law offers. 292 We often protect speech based on a speaker’s
subjective belief that a law impacts their expression, even though most others may not view the law as touching on expression at all. 293 For example,
most drivers who had to attach a license plate with a state motto likely did
not feel like they were being compelled to “say” anything, but the appellees
in Wooley v. Maynard subjectively felt otherwise, which was why they could
raise a successful as-applied challenge. 294 As the Supreme Court has noted
elsewhere, “[a] person gets from a symbol the meaning he puts into it, and
what is one man’s comfort and inspiration is another’s jest and scorn.” 295
We don’t even require speech to be sincere. We would give heightened
protection to speech even if the speaker didn’t believe what he or she was
saying, but still wanted to say it. Indeed, in New York Times v. Sullivan the
Court protected speech that was not true. 296 In contrast, a religious objector
must prove her beliefs are sincere to receive protection. And sincerity acts
as a significant gatekeeper to religious objectors receiving protection.
For example, in a criminal drug trafficking case, an Arizona couple attempted to raise drug money through its operation called the “Church of
Cognizance,” founded on the teaching that marijuana is both a deity and
sacrament. 297 After the Border Patrol busted their “backpack runners” from
Mexico, the couple argued that their drug-running was part of their church’s
religious activities and thus legally protected by RFRA. In an opinion written by then-Judge Gorsuch, the Tenth Circuit held that the couple’s religious
beliefs were not sincere—a threshold determination in every religious liberty case—and that the “church” was a mere front for a drug operation. The
court explained that religious liberty laws do not “offer refuge to canny op291

LEITER, supra note 64, at 34; see also LUPU & TUTTLE, supra note 55, at 27 (arguing that
“[i]f the government cannot evaluate the significance of a particular religious practice within a
believer’s faith, it will effectively lack the ability to identify—in a principled way—meritorious
claims for accommodation”).
292
See, e.g., Nat’l Socialist Party of Am. v. Vill. of Skokie, 432 U.S. 43, 43–44 (1977) (holding that because there were First Amendment implications, they must “provide strict procedural
safeguards”).
293
See, e.g., Jacobs, supra note 132, at 160 (critiquing the way speech doctrine depends on
the “subjective intensity of the speaker’s reaction” to the law’s requirement).
294
430 U.S. 705, 707–08, 717 (1972).
295
W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 632–33 (1943).
296
376 U.S. 254, 257–59, 264 (1964).
297
United States v. Quaintance, 608 F.3d 717, 718 (10th Cir. 2010).
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erators who seek through subterfuge to avoid laws they’d prefer to ignore,”
such as “those who set up ‘churches’ as cover for illegal drug distribution
operations.” 298
Further, the belief at issue must be “genuinely ‘religious’” to receive
protection. 299 “[P]hilosophical and personal rather than religious” beliefs
are not enough. 300 In Cavanaugh v. Bartelt, for example, a district court determined that the satirical adherence to the “doctrine of the Flying Spaghetti
Monster” did not constitute a religious belief qualifying for First Amendment or RLUIPA protection. 301 Instead, the court explained that this creed
was “a parody, intended to advance an argument about science, the evolution of life, and the place of religion in public education.” 302 Thus, the
plaintiff was unable to prove that his religious exercise was burdened. 303
The very existence of these threshold requirements in the religious exercise realm also surely shapes the type of cases that litigants are willing to
bring, as they assess whether their practice is really religious and based on a
belief that they can prove is both sincerely held and actually burdened by
the government action. In this manner, religious exercise claims are constrained by doctrine in ways that other constitutional claims are not. These
constraints provide at least one explanation for why the volume of religious
exercise cases is so much lower than speech and association cases.
IV. THE ANOMALOUS MAJORITARIAN JURISPRUDENCE OF SMITH
The case studies and empirical analysis above indicate that as-applied
challenges are praised elsewhere in constitutional jurisprudence (particularly the speech context), but uniquely maligned in the free exercise context
without justification. What, then, accounts for this disparate treatment of
two very similar 304 types of constitutional challenges? One clue may come
from analyzing the majoritarian jurisprudential foundation on which Employment Division v. Smith relies, and that has been soundly rejected in the
speech context.
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Yellowbear v. Lampert, 741 F.3d 48, 54 (10th Cir. 2014) (citing Quaintance, 608 F.3d at
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A. Majoritarian Reasoning of Gobitis Overruled by
Barnette in the Speech Context
In 1935, during an elementary school’s daily pledge of allegiance ceremony, a ten-year-old fifth grader named William Gobitis refused to salute
the flag. This daily patriotic ritual at the time involved a “stiff-arm” salute
that some complained looked very similar to the one Hitler required in Nazi
Germany. 305 Some religious leaders had even given speeches denouncing
participation in the “Heil Hitler” salute. 306 When William declined to participate, his teacher tried to force his arm up, but William held it in his pocket
and successfully resisted. The next day, William’s eleven-year-old sister,
Lillian, did the same thing. She told her teacher, “I can’t salute the flag anymore. The Bible says at Exodus chapter 20 that we can’t have any other
gods before Jehovah God.” The teacher hugged Lillian and called her a
“dear girl.” 307
The classmates of William and Lillian Gobitis were first astonished
and then disgusted with what they viewed as an unforgivable lack of patriotism. They would chant “[h]ere comes Jehovah” at the children and shower them with pebbles on their way to school every day. The Gobitis parents
supported the consciences of their children, and in fact this Jehovah’s Witness family was part of a national religious movement objecting to the flag
salute. But they too were shunned by their community: their family-owned
grocery store was threatened with a mob attack and they were subjected to a
boycott. After the children were expelled from school, the family turned to
the courts. 308
This legal dispute led to Minersville School District v. Gobitis, one of
the primary cases on which the Smith decision relied. 309 In this case, the
Gobitis family challenged the generally applicable public-school requirement that students either perform a salute to the national flag as part of a
daily ceremony or face expulsion. 310 In this case, no one disputed the sin305

Barnette, 319 U.S. at 627.
NOAH FELDMAN, SCORPIONS: THE BATTLES AND TRIUMPHS OF FDR’S GREAT SUPREME
COURT JUSTICES 179 (2010).
307
Id. at 179–80; see also SHAWN FRANCIS PETERS, JUDGING JEHOVAH’S WITNESSES: RELIGIOUS PERSECUTION AND THE DAWN OF THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION 33–40, 53–54 (2000) (explaining the tenacity of the Jehovah Witnesses’ faith that led to Minersville School District v.
Gobitis); Richard Danzig, Justice Frankfurter’s Opinions in the Flag Salute Cases: Blending
Logic and Psychologic in Constitutional Decisionmaking, 36 STAN. L. REV. 675, 677–78 (1984)
(analyzing Justice Frankfurter’s opinion on the flag saluting cases based on a legal and psychological understanding); Lillian Gobitis, The Courage to Put God First, AWAKE!, July 22, 1993, at
12–15 (recalling what led up to her Supreme Court case).
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FELDMAN, supra note 306, at 179–80.
309
Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990) (quoting Minersville
Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 594–95 (1940), overruled by Barnette, 319 U.S. at 624).
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Gobitis, 310 U.S. at 591.
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cere religious objections the Gobitis children had to participating in this
ceremony. 311
There was no question in the Gobitis Court’s eyes that the generally
applicable flag salute requirement was constitutional. The Court stated:
“[t]hat the flag-salute is an allowable portion of a school program for those
who do not invoke conscientious scruples is surely not debatable.” 312 Rather, the issue was “[w]hen does the constitutional guarantee [of religious
liberty] compel exemption from doing what society thinks necessary for the
promotion of some great common end, or from a penalty for conduct which
appears dangerous to the general good?” 313 Another way to ask the same
question is whether an as-applied challenge to the generally applicable flag
salute requirement should be upheld for the Jehovah’s Witness children,
providing a “religious exemption from a law that bound everybody.” 314
The Court rejected this as-applied challenge, arguing that “[t]he religious
liberty that the Constitution protects has never excluded legislation of general
scope not directed against doctrinal loyalties of particular sects.” 315 The Court
also cited to Reynolds v. United States, observing that “[c]onscientious
scruples have not, in the course of the long struggle for religious toleration,
relieved the individual from obedience to a general law not aimed at the
promotion or restriction of religious beliefs.” 316 Thus, the Court refused to
provide what it characterized as “exceptional immunity . . . to dissidents,”
and the Jehovah’s Witness children were forced to either salute the flag or
be expelled from school. 317 The Court in Gobitis also made clear that its
reasoning was not limited to free exercise, but extended to a constitutional
challenge based on speech rights as well. 318
The Court primarily relied on the theory of judicial restraint developed
by Justice Felix Frankfurter, arguing that courts must defer to the will of the
majority, and that it would be an “arbitrary” exercise of power undermining
the strength of the government to set such legislative determinations
aside. 319 In the theory set forth by Frankfurter, “the judiciary was supposed
to defer to reasonable judgments made by legislators, not overturn them
because it disagreed with their substance.” 320
311
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Id. at 596; FELDMAN, supra note 306, at 181–82.
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Justice Harlan Stone authored a vigorous dissent, arguing that simply
deferring to the general rules passed by a legislature amounted to “no less
than the surrender of the constitutional protection of the liberty of small
minorities to the popular will.” 321 Stone relied on his famous footnote four
analysis in the previous case of United States v. Carolene Products Co., and
“pointed to the importance of a searching judicial inquiry into the legislative judgment in situations where prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may tend to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied on to protect minorities.” 322 Legislation that operated “to
repress the religious freedom of small minorities, . . . must at least be subject to the same judicial scrutiny as legislation which we have recently held
to infringe the constitutional liberty of . . . racial minorities,” Stone argued. 323 This was because, in his view, the “Constitution expresses more
than the conviction of the people that democratic processes must be preserved at all costs.” 324
Just three years later, in the Barnette decision (announced on Flag
Day), Justice Stone’s reasoning won the day and the Court overruled Gobitis—though only speaking clearly in terms of First Amendment expressive
rights. 325 Specifically, the Court upheld an injunction “restrain[ing] enforcement as to the plaintiffs and those of that class” based on the “limiting
principles of the First Amendment.” 326 In some of the most famous lines
from First Amendment jurisprudence, the Supreme Court waxed eloquent
about the grave risk of “coerc[ing] uniformity” in support of majoritarian
sentiment. 327 “Those who begin coercive elimination of dissent soon find
themselves exterminating dissenters. Compulsory unification of opinion
achieves only the unanimity of the graveyard.” 328 The Court thus concluded
that “[i]f there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that
no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics,
nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess
by word or act their faith therein.” 329
321
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Some scholars have argued that Barnette was not a “religious exemption case,” and was instead a case about “bar[ring] enforcement of the mandatory salute statute . . . .” 330 To be sure, the Court in Barnette avoided the
use of typical religious exemption language. But this was not a case about
whether the pledge of allegiance was being stricken (or even partially
stricken) for facial invalidity, or whether schools were prohibited from holding flag salute ceremonies (or aspects of the ceremonies) as a general matter. In fact, those sorts of lawsuits would come, but much later. 331 Barnette
was a case in which the Court “restrained enforcement” of an otherwise
valid policy “as to the plaintiffs and those of that class.” 332 To qualify for
this exemption, Plaintiffs (and others in the future who were similarly situated), were being protected based on their First Amendment objection to an
otherwise valid exercise of government authority. That targeted invalidation
of government action is similar to what we think of as an as-applied challenge in other contexts.
Regardless of the nuances of the type of remedy offered in this case,
what is clear is that Barnette instituted a rule of law that was distinctly protective of minority rights against majoritarian rules, and which remains
foundational law in speech jurisprudence. 333
B. Gobitis Resurrected by Smith in the Free Exercise Context
Though Gobitis remains bad law in the realm of free speech law, it was
resurrected as one of the primary jurisprudential pillars of reasoning in
Smith. The Smith Court quoted the following passage from Gobitis:
[c]onscientious scruples have not, in the course of the long struggle for religious toleration, relieved the individual from obedience
to a general law not aimed at the promotion or restriction of religious beliefs. The mere possession of religious convictions which

idea itself offensive or disagreeable”); see also Stewart Jay, The Creation of the First Amendment
Right to Free Expression: From the Eighteenth Century to the Mid-Twentieth Century, 34 WM.
MITCHELL L. REV. 773, 774 (2008) (noting that “[r]epudiation of governmentally-mandated orthodoxy and tolerance for unpopular speech are two sides of the guiding principle in modern free
speech law”).
330
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331
See, e.g., Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 8, 10 (2004).
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333
See, e.g., Heffernan v. Paterson, N.J., 136 S. Ct. 1412, 1417 (2016) (citing Barnette as
setting forth the First Amendment’s “basic constitutional requirement”); Obergefell v. Hodges,
135 S. Ct. 2584, 2605–06 (2015) (quoting Barnette for the principle that the purpose of the constitution “was to withdraw certain subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place
them beyond the reach of majorities and officials and to establish them as legal principles to be
applied by the courts”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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contradict the relevant concerns of a political society does not relieve the citizen from the discharge of political responsibilities. 334
The Court relied on this reasoning to conclude that “an individual’s religious beliefs [do not] excuse him from compliance with an otherwise valid
law prohibiting conduct that the State is free to regulate.” 335 The precedential value of Smith’s reliance on Gobitis is dubious. As Professor Michael
McConnell put it, “[r]elying on Gobitis without mentioning Barnette is like
relying on Plessy v. Ferguson without mentioning Brown v. Board of Education.” 336
Four justices recognized the problem with relying on Gobitis. Justice
Sandra Day O’Connor, for example, relied in her concurrence instead on the
reasoning of Barnette, quoting the following passage:
[t]he very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain
subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place
them beyond the reach of majorities and officials and to establish
them as legal principles to be applied by the courts. One’s right to
life, liberty, and property, to free speech, a free press, freedom of
worship and assembly, and other fundamental rights may not be
submitted to vote; they depend on the outcome of no elections. 337
334
Smith, 494 U.S. at 879 (quoting Gobitis, 310 U.S. at 594–95) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
335
Id. at 878–79.
336
McConnell, supra note 38, at 1124. Employment Division v. Smith also relied on “a Mormon polygamy case from 1879, [which] was decided on the theory that the Free Exercise Clause
protects only beliefs and not conduct—a premise that the Court repudiated in 1940.” Id. (footnote
omitted) (citing Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303–04 (1940)); see also Bruce Ackerman, Levels of Generality in Constitutional Interpretation: Liberating Abstraction, 59 U. CHI. L.
REV. 317, 326 (1992) (arguing that “Gobitis should be read as an especially pure example of the
New Deal approach to the Bill of Rights”).
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Smith, 494 U.S. at 902–03 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (quoting Barnette, 319 U.S. at 638)
(internal quotation marks omitted); see also GORDON S. WOOD, CREATION OF THE AMERICAN
REPUBLIC: 1776–1787, at 593–96 (1998) (noting that our Constitution did not create pure democracy; it created many checks and balances on the excesses of majoritarian power); Jack L. Landau,
Some Thoughts About State Constitutional Interpretation, 115 PENN ST. L. REV. 837, 849 (2011)
(“The Bill of Rights itself is essentially a series of limitations on the exercise of majoritarian authority. What the framers of the federal [C]onstitution created was not a popular democracy, but a
republic of fairly elaborate checks and balances.”). See generally WILLI PAUL ADAMS, THE FIRST
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONS: REPUBLICAN IDEOLOGY AND THE MAKING OF THE STATE CONSTITUTIONS IN THE REVOLUTIONARY ERA 110–14 (Rita Kimber & Robert Kimber trans., 1980) (detailing the evolution of how the words “democracy” and “republic” were used); ALEXANDER M.
BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 16–
23 (1986) (discussing the “counter-majoritarian difficulty” of meaningful judicial review in a
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In a nutshell, one of the principles upon which Smith relies is that “the
true course of judicial duty” is to “keep[] their hands off” the majoritarian
decisions of “legislative power,” as an exercise of judicial self-restraint. 338
In contrast, the jurisprudence Smith overruled stands for the proposition that
religious exemptions “protect the rights of those whose religious practices
are not shared by the majority and may be viewed with hostility” because
“[t]he history of . . . free exercise doctrine amply demonstrates the harsh
impact majoritarian rule has had on unpopular or emerging religious
groups.” 339
As the Supreme Court previously noted, the diversity of religious beliefs in our nation should weigh in favor of us providing more protection—
not less.
In the realm of religious faith, and in that of political belief,
sharp differences arise. In both fields the tenets of one man may
seem the rankest error to his neighbor . . . . [I]n spite of the probability of excesses and abuses, these liberties are, in the long
view, essential to enlightened opinion and right conduct on the
part of the citizens of a democracy.
The essential characteristic of these liberties is, that under their
shield many types of life, character, opinion and belief can develop unmolested and unobstructed. Nowhere is this shield more
necessary than in our own country for a people composed of
many races and of many creeds. 340
As-applied challenges to generally applicable laws allow a society as
diverse as ours to accommodate the “sharp differences [that] arise” in beliefs or preferences while still allowing the democratically-enacted rules of
law to continue to operate for the public good. The other alternative is to
disregard the minority views that are not protected by our political process.
Regardless of one’s ultimate views on the merits of a countermajoritarian approach, the divergent precedents of Gobitis and Barnette provide one
(AND HOW WE THE PEOPLE CAN CORRECT IT) (2006) (same); Barry Friedman, The Birth of an
Academic Obsession: The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Five, 112 YALE L.J.
153, 155–62 (2002) (analyzing the history of judicial review to move beyond the countermajoritarian difficulty as a constitutional theory).
338
Barnette, 319 U.S. at 648, 670 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
339
Smith, 494 U.S. at 902 (O’Connor, J., concurring). James Madison also famously wrote to
Thomas Jefferson that that Bill of Rights was but “parchment barriers,” and that the “invasion of
private rights is chiefly to be apprehended, not from acts of Government contrary to the sense of
its constituents, but from acts in which the Government is the mere instrument of the major number of the constituents.” JAMES MADISON, Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct.
17, 1788), in 11 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON, 7 MARCH 1788–1 MARCH 1789, at 295–300
(Robert A. Rutland et al. eds., 1977).
340
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explanation for the disfavored treatment of religious exemptions. In Gobitis,
the Court determined that judicial restraint required it to simply defer to the
will of the majority, which required school children to perform a stiff-arm
flag salute against their conscience because the majority thought they
should. Just three years later, in the Barnette decision, the Court overruled
its Gobitis holding in the context of expressive rights, explaining that the
“very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects from the
vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities.” 341 Barnette thus instituted a rule of law that was distinctly protective of minority rights, and that remains foundational jurisprudence in the
context of speech rights. In contrast, this Article demonstrates how modern
religious exercise law has (mistakenly) resurrected the deferential and majoritarian reasoning of Gobitis, while asserting that requests to treat religious exercise like other First Amendment rights are somehow out-of-step
with our constitutional traditions.
For critics trying to evaluate which approach is better, the following
question is instructive: Do we want to live in a society where the government can force school children to salute flags, simply because the majority
likes that idea at the time? If the answer is no, that worldview hearkens to
the counter-majoritarian reasoning of Barnette. That same principle also
underlies statutes like RFRA. To support instead a double standard that
treats religious exercise as less deserving than any other First Amendment
right, then, would be the true anomaly.
CONCLUSION
Viewing religious exemptions through the lens of as-applied challenges makes clear that such exemptions are not anomalous at all. When requests for individual religious exemptions are compared to as-applied challenges in other constitutional contexts, it turns out that providing religious
exemptions from otherwise valid laws is both the most modest and the preferred method of adjudicating conflicts between individual rights and laws
passed for the public good.
The First Amendment cases surveyed in this Article indicate that religious as-applied challenges do not result in preferential treatment for religious objectors as a constitutional matter. Our new RFRA survey contradicts
the notion that religious objections are much more likely to prompt a court to
strike down government action under RFRA post-Hobby Lobby. Our findings
also indicate that cases dealing with religious objections to laws are less voluminous than other cases dealing with other expressive First Amendment
341
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claims, and the religious cases do not appear to be undergoing a trend of dramatic growth. In fact, the trend appears to be a slight decrease in volume.
Thus, through allowing as-applied challenges, religious exemption
schemes like RFRA simply restore religious exercise rights to a similar level
of protection already offered to other rights housed in the First Amendment
and necessary for the protection of minority views in our pluralistic society.

